inside the building during the hostage-taking, alerting them when the time was right to enter the residence. According to their communication, a lone MRTA guerrilla was on the second floor of the building guarding the hostages while the rest of the group were playing foosball on the ground floor, and only one guerrilla was guarding the main door. 152 162. Several underground explosions initiated the operation, after which around 80 commandos divided into the different strike forces (supra paras. 155 and 156) entered the ambassador’s residence through the access ways opened in doors and walls.153 The detonation was the signal for the eight squads of the Alpha and Delta strike forces to enter the residence and take control of their assigned areas. 163. The technique used by the commandos was to take control of the buildings and rescue hostages by entering two-by-two into each closed room and searching each successive area until they had taken full control of them all, using “selective instinctive shooting” (SIS). 154 164. The rescue operation successfully freed the hostages.155 One hostage, then judge Carlos Ernesto Giusti Acuña, lost his life.156 Other fatalities included the commandos Army Lieutenant Cf. Ruling by the Third Special Criminal Chamber of the Superior Court of Lima, October 15, 2012 (evidence file, volume XX, annexed to the representatives’ observations on the State’s preliminary objections, folio 13505). 152 Cf. Annex 02, Report of Operations of the “Tenaz Patrol”, April 30, 1997, p. 6 (merits file, volume II, annex 7 offered by the State for planning the exercise of “reconstruction of the facts”, folio 1022); statement by José Daniel Williams Zapata before a public attestor, January 29, 2014 (evidence file, volume XXX, affidavits, folios 20719 to 20731), and ruling by the Third Special Criminal Chamber of the Superior Court of Lima, October 15, 2012 (evidence file, volume XX, annexed to the representatives’ observations on the State’s preliminary objections, folio 13506). 153 Cf. Ruling by the Third Special Criminal Chamber of the Superior Court of Lima, October 15, 2012 (evidence file, volume XX, annexed to the representatives’ observations on the State’s preliminary objections, folio 13509). With respect to SIS, the ruling by the Transitory Criminal Law Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice on an appeal to vacate judgment, 3521-2012 July 24, 2013 (evidence file, volume XXI, helpful evidence, folio 14692), offers a description of this technique as provided in the Peruvian Army Manual for Selective Instinctive Shooting: 154 […] The Army of Peru, prior to the events of the case, had approved the Manual for Selective Instinctive Shooting, under resolution […] of May eighteenth, nineteen ninety-four. According to the manual, commandos must be fully instructed and trained, as indeed was done for a four-month period, first as dry runs (the gun is unloaded but the exercise is done realistically to perfect every movement), followed by training with live ammunition and loaded weapons: light arms, machine pistol, assault rifle). SIS is the ideal method for rapid fire and has proven highly effective in both open fields and closed areas. Sights on the firearm are used as the point of reference, and two cartridges can be shot in an average of two seconds, eliminating enemies even if they are in a crowd by using the selective method. Two rapid-fire shots can be directed at the target in a maximum of two seconds; the shots are aimed at the head at short distances (six, eight and ten meters) and at the body at longer distances. To check the aiming sights on the weapon, it is important to shoot at a reference guide (chest with three cartridges), then proceed to align the weapons’ sights if the bullets did not strike the target correctly. The so-called “safety shot” is used only in a combat operation, during a face off. When terrorists or criminals are hit, the commando must make certain that they are no longer a threat or danger, and then continue with the operation. […] Cf. Report 01/1st Div FFEE Operation “Chavín de Huántar” (hostage rescue operation) April 30, 1997, p. 11 (evidence file, volume I, annex 2.a to the case submission brief, folio 52), and Annex 02, Report on Operation “Tenaz Patrol”, April 30, 1997, p. 15 (merits file, volume II, annex 7 offered by the State for planning the exercise of “reconstruction of the facts”, folio 1022). 155 Cf. Autopsy protocol 97-1969 of Carlos Ernesto Giusti Acuña, April 22, 1997 (evidence file, volume II, annex 14 to the case submission brief, folios 720 to 723); Report 01/1st Div FFEE Operation “Chavín de Huántar” (hostage rescue operation) April 30, 1997, p. 11 (evidence file, volume I, annex 2.a to the case submission brief, folio 52), and Annex 02, Report on Operation “Tenaz Patrol”, April 30, 1997, p. 15 (merits file, volume II, annex 7 offered by the State for planning the exercise of “reconstruction of the facts”, folio 1022). 156