responsible should be brought before the military jurisdiction in keeping with the legal system contained in the code of military justice; that Article 173 of the Peruvian Constitution also serves as an essential argument and is fully applicable and mandatory when it stipulates that in cases of in-service offenses by members of the Armed Forces and the National Police, they are to be subject to the relevant jurisdiction and the code of military justice, and this provision is also applicable to civilians for crimes of treason and terrorism; it is further the case that punishable acts under this jurisdiction are set forth in the code of military justice as crimes against human rights […]; […] That the provisions of Article 324 of the code of military justice must be consistent with the provisions of Article 173 of the Peruvian Constitution, as the objects of the alleged offenses were acting as an armed group belonging to the “Túpac Amaru” terrorist organization […], and therefore it would be wrong to hold them as civilians; […] That the decision on which jurisdiction should investigate and try any excesses that may have been committed, considering that the hostage rescue operation was completed with the involvement of military personnel, members of the group of commandos and personnel not belonging to that group, must be made in strict subjection to the provisions of Articles 342 and 343 of the code of military justice; thus, both the military jurisdiction and the civilian jurisdiction should independently hear the crime corresponding to it under applicable criminal law; […] That [… the] members of the commando team had taken part in a military operation, obeying orders issued under the terms of the Constitution by those with authority to do so, and any criminal offenses they may have committed should be heard by the military courts; by contrast, those who were not members of the commandos, who may have committed offenses or crimes established in the law, should therefore be subject to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. […] That the defendants in the ordinary court proceedings, Vladimiro Montesinos Torres, Nicolás de Bari Hermo[z]a Ríos, Roberto Huamán A[s]curra and Jesús Zamudio Aliaga, were not part of the military operation and are included in the investigation of possible cases of extrajudicial execution against captured terrorists, and this would be a case of human rights violation codified as a crime against humanity, similar to other cases that have been reopened in the ordinary courts, and therefore the processes should be joined […] especially as they also derived from the same criminal intent […].234 190. The investigating judge, having examined certain evidence, issued a final report addressed to the President of the CSJM War Chamber, presenting an analysis of the facts and their relationship to the evidence. He concluded, among other things: (i) that it has not been proven that orders had been given during the phase prior to the execution of “Plan Nipón 96”, whether verbally, in writing, or by any other means, to indiscriminately eliminate or kill all the members of the MRTA; (ii) that the members of the Delta Eight squad were tasked with taking control of room “I” and verifying and evacuating the hostages found there, most of whom were employees of the Japanese embassy in Peru and Japanese business owners; (iii) that the bodies of the MRTA members Peceros Pedraza and Meléndez Cueva were found in that room with signs of having received multiple gunshot wounds, leading to death; (iv) that these deaths were probably inflicted by shooters Alvarado Díaz and Paz Ramos, and (v) that the evidence did not convincingly show that the gunshots causing these deaths had been fired under circumstances in which they had first been rendered defenseless by capture or injury. The investigating judge therefore held that there was no evidence of the commission or Ruling by the Transitory Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court on August 16, 2002 (evidence file, volume XXIII, helpful evidence, folios 15778 to 15781). 234