law which play an indispensable and universally-accepted role in mitigating the savagery and inhumanity of armed conflict.”342 273. Therefore, given that the American Convention does not explicitly define the scope that the Court must attach to the concept of arbitrariness in order for deprivation of life to be held as contrary to the Convention in situations of armed conflict, it is proper to draw on the corpus juris of applicable international humanitarian law (supra para. 270) to determine the extent of a State’s obligations to respect and guarantee the right to life in such situations. The analysis of whether Article 4 of the American Convention has been violated must therefore consider several principles, including distinction (infra para. 276), proportionality343 and precaution.344 (ii) Necessity for the use of force in the framework of a hostage rescue operation 274. Under this heading, the Court recognizes that the State’s use of force took place in the setting of an operation by security forces with a precise target: to free the hostages who had been held by the members of the MRTA in the residence of the Japanese ambassador in Peru since December 17, 1996. It was therefore legitimate for the State to make use of force under the circumstances of the specific case, and indeed, neither the Inter-American Commission nor the representatives in the instant case has questioned the legitimacy of the operation, 345 which was undertaken in response to the need to free the hostages alive (supra paras. 147 to 150 and infra para. 284). 275. It is therefore acceptable to hold that the State needed to adopt all necessary measures to relieve the situation of the hostages and, in particular, to ensure their release, so long as applicable provisions of international humanitarian law and human rights were respected. (iii) Safeguards of Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions 276. The principle of distinction connotes a customary rule applicable to international and non-international armed conflicts and reads, “[t]he parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants,” such that “[a]ttacks may only be directed ECtHR, Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GS], Nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90. Judgment of September 18, 2009, para. 185. 342 According to the tenets of international humanitarian law, the principle of proportionality refers to a customary rule for both international and non-international armed conflicts that stipulates that “[l]aunching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited.” Henkaerts, Jean – Marie, Doswald – Beck Louise, Customary International Humanitarian Law, volume I, rules, ICRC, CICR, Cambridge, 2009, p. 46, Rule 14. See also, Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, supra, para. 214. 343 According to international humanitarian law, the principle of precaution refers to a customary rule for both international and non-international armed conflicts which establishes that “[i]n the conduct of military operations, constant care must be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects”, and that “a]ll feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.” It also stipulates that “[e]ach party to the conflict must take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of warfare with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.” Henkaerts, Jean – Marie, Doswald – Beck Louise, Customary International Humanitarian Law, volume I, rules, ICRC, CICR, Cambridge, 2009, p. 51, Rules 15 and 15. See also, Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, supra, para. 216. 344 The representatives said that they “had no intention whatsoever of challenging Operation Nipón 96 per se, also known as Operation Chavín de Huántar, and the way it was conducted overall.” The Commission assured that “the design of Operation Chavín de Huántar served a legitimate purpose and met the also legitimate end of rescuing hostages who were in danger[; thus,] so long as a situation of combat remained, the members of the MRTA terrorist group were, in principle, legitimate targets under international humanitarian law.” 345