consistent with the photograph submitted to this Court during the exercise of reconstruction of the facts. 307. Unlike the other members of the MRTA, Eduardo Nicolás Cruz Sánchez bore only two injuries: one from the projectile of a firearm that entered through the back left of the neck and exited on the right side of the head, and the other in the abdomen-pelvis (supra para. 292). The Court would note that this pattern of injury is manifestly different from those of the other members of the MRTA. Most of them had five or more gunshot wounds, but the body of Eduardo Nicolás Cruz Sánchez had only one injury caused by a firearm.393 This could suggest that the death of Cruz Sánchez occurred under circumstances different from those of the other guerrillas. C) Conclusions of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 308. Regarding the facts of the case, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission devoted a chapter of its final report to what it called “extrajudicial executions at the residence of the Japanese ambassador (1997)”, in which it reported, “there are sufficient grounds to reasonably assume that during the rescue operation, actions were committed that were in violation of human rights, and an impartial, independent investigation [is therefore] essential, to determine the responsibilities for the case.” 394 309. The final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission particularly stated: The hypotheses raised by the forensic examinations are reinforced with the statements rendered to police authorities and subsequently to the investigating judge by National Police Sergeants Raúl Robles Reynoso and Marcial Teodorico Torres Arteaga. Both officers were responsible for the detention of Eduardo Nicolás Cruz Sánchez, alias ‘Tito’, and delivered him alive to a member of the army upon completion of the operation. These National Police officers […] have claimed that one of the subversives left through the tunnel that connected house No. 1 to the ambassador’s residence, hiding among the other hostages. When they were in the yard of the house, one of the hostages signaled to them, advising them that a member of the MRTA was trying to escape. They proceeded to confront him and neutralize him, they bound his hands, placed him in a dorsal decubitus position, and then reported to their commanding officer, Army Colonel Jesús Zamudio Aliaga, who told them to keep him there and that he would have him picked up. Moments later, a uniformed, unidentified ‘commando’ with his face covered emerged through the tunnel from the ambassador’s residence to house No. 1, took the subversive alive and led him through the tunnel into the residence. According to the witnesses, the subversive was wearing a dark green polo shirt, dark shorts, brown shoes, no socks, and was clearly seen not to be carrying a weapon. The neutralized subversive, later identified as Eduardo It should be noted that the presence of a firearm projectile in the region of the thorax is in dispute. Cf. Autopsy report 0878-2001 prepared by the Institute of Forensic Medicine on March 20, 2001 (evidence file, volume I, annex 7 to the case submission brief, folios 582 to 587). See the chest x-ray report by John H.M. Austin, July 16, 2012 (evidence file, volume XI, annex 14 to the State’s answering brief, folio 7435), and expert statement delivered by Juan Manuel Cartagena Pastor at public hearing before the Inter-American Court, February 3 and 4, 2014. Expert witness Luis Bernardo Fondebrider and the Third Special Criminal Chamber were handled separately in the case file. Cf. Expert witness statement by Bernardo Fondebrider at public hearing before the Inter-American Court, February 3 and 4, 2014, and ruling by the Third Special Criminal Chamber of the Superior Court of Lima, October 15, 2012 (evidence file, volume XX, annexed to the representatives’ observations on the State’s preliminary objections, folios 13614 to 13626). 393 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Informe Final, 2003, volume VII, chapter 2.66, Extrajudicial executions at the residence of the Japanese ambassador (1997), p. 719 (evidence file, volume I, annex 1 to the case submission brief, folio 5). 394