- 84 259. Regarding the first aspect, the Court reiterates that the guarantee of tenure for judges requires that they may not be dismissed or removed from office, unless they commit acts that are clearly punishable; in other words, based on the most serious grounds of misconduct or incompetence (supra paras. 196, 198 and 199). Therefore, the Court considers that, based on the guarantee of judicial tenure, the grounds for removing judges from their posts must be clear and established by law. Taking into account that dismissal or removal from office is the most restrictive and severe disciplinary measure that can be adopted, the possibility of its application must be predictable, either because the punishable conduct is expressly and clearly established, precisely, clearly and previously, by law, or because the law delegates its imposition to the judge or to an infra-legal norm, under objective criteria that limit the scope of discretion. Moreover, the possibility of dismissal must abide by the above-mentioned principle of extreme gravity. Indeed, the protection of judicial independence requires that the dismissal of judges be considered as the ultima ratio in judicial disciplinary matters. 260. The Court underlines that the principle of tenure for judges is established in the domestic law of Honduras. Thus, article 51 of the Judicial Service Act stipulates that: Judicial officials shall enjoy the right of tenure when they enter the service in the appropriate manner and may only be removed when they give cause for dismissal under this law and its regulations.428 261. Furthermore, the Court notes that the disciplinary regime applied to the presumed victims, established mainly in the Judicial Service Act and its Regulations, prima facie was adapted to this, because the removal of a judge was considered the most severe sanction and, in principle, was reserved for the most serious conduct.429 In this regard, the Court notes that the Judicial Service Act specified a series of disciplinary offenses, considered as acts that “are inimical to the dignity of the administration of justice” in its article 53 (which the Regulations to this Act referred to as “less serious offenses”) and “acts contrary to the effectiveness of the administration of justice,” defined in its article 54 (which the Regulations to this Act referred to as “serious offenses”).430 The Act did not establish clearly the sanctions that corresponded to each of these offenses, but rather established that the penalties (reprimand, fine, suspension from office, and dismissal) should be applied in keeping with the severity of the offense and taking into account the background to the case 431 (supra paras. 74 and 75). However, by classifying the severity of the different offenses (as minor, less serious and serious offenses), the Regulations to the Act did establish the sanctions 428 Judicial Service Act, article 51 (evidence file, 4162). 429 This is revealed by the Act and its Regulations, as well as in the decision of the Judicial Service Council in the proceedings against Mr. Chévez de la Rocha in which the Council indicated that “based on the principle of proportionality, […] there must be a correlation between the offense committed and the sanction imposed; thus, the institution must prove that the judicial official has committed an offense of such a serious nature that it is impossible to sustain the relationship owing to the prejudice that the irregular activity of the official would cause to the citizenry; and an offense that is expressly mentioned in the rules of procedure of the Judicial Service as warranting dismissal; […] dismissal […] is the highest penalty, especially taking into account the serious prejudice that this measure causes to a judicial official.” Decision of the Judicial Service Council of August 24, 2011 (evidence file, folios 2236 and 2237). 430 The acts that are inimical to the dignity of the administration of justice were also included in article 172 of the Regulations governing the Judicial Service Act, while the acts contrary to the effectiveness of the administration of justice were included in article 173 of the Regulations. Cf. Regulations governing the Judicial Service Act (evidence file, folios 196 and 197), and Judicial Service Act (evidence file, folios 4163 to 4166). 431 Articles 57 and 59 of the Judicial Service Act established that: “When, in the opinion of the superior, the offense does not give rise to another sanction, the superior shall summarily and in writing reprimand the offender,” and that “Suspension from office for up to three months may be imposed for serious offenses or repetition of minor offenses” and could be accompanied by “exclusion from the service after the first time and, of necessity, will produce this if the offense is repeated.” Judicial Service Act, article 59 (evidence file, folio 4166). However, these articles do not establish which offenses were considered minor or serious, and also constitutes a different classification from the one established in the Regulations to the Act.