- 88 272. Despite this, the Court notes that the Supreme Court of Justice and the Judicial Service Council resorted to disciplinary grounds that used vague concepts such as the “dignity of the administration of justice” or the “decorum of the office.” The Court notes that, even though it may be admitted that the precision required in matters of disciplinary sanctions is less than in criminal matters (supra para. 257), the use of open assumptions or vague concepts such as the “dignity of the administration of justice” or the “decorum of the office” require the establishment of objective criteria that guide the interpretation or content that should be given to such concepts in order to limit discretion in the application of sanctions. Such criteria can be established by law or by means of interpretation in light of case law that places these concepts within the context, purpose and objective of the norm, in order to avoid the arbitrary use of such assumptions, based on the personal and private opinions or prejudices of the judges when they are applied. 273. In this regard, the Court recalls that the purpose of disciplinary control is to assess the conduct, suitability and performance of the judge as a public official (supra para. 267). Thus, the disciplinary regulations for judges should be aimed at protecting the judicial function and, therefore, to assess the performance of the judge in the exercise of his or her functions. Accordingly, when applying open or indeterminate disciplinary norms that require considering concepts, such as the decorum and the dignity of the administration of justice, it is essential to take into account the effects that the conduct examined could have on the exercise of the judicial function, either positively by the establishment of normative criteria for its application or by means of an adequate interpretation and statement of reasons by the judges when applying them. To the contrary, the scope of these disciplinary measures would be subject to the private or moral beliefs of the judges.443 274. None of the preceding assumptions was verified in this case. The laws did not provide the bases or the objective criteria that would have allowed the scope of the disciplinary measures to be delimited, and the decisions of the judges did not establish the rules that would have restricted possible arbitrariness in their application. 275. The Court also recalls that the obligation to adopt domestic provisions established in Article 2 of the Convention obliges the States Parties to adopt the legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights and freedoms protected by the Convention (supra para. 213). 276. Based on the above, the Court concludes that the State violated Article 9 of the Convention, in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 of the Convention to the detriment of Adán Guillermo López Lone, Tirza del Carmen Flores Lanza, Luis Alonso Chévez de la Rocha and Ramón Enrique Barrios Maldonado, owing to the excessive discretion in the establishment of the sanction of dismissal (supra paras. 259 to 264), as well as the vagueness and breadth with which the disciplinary grounds were established and applied to the victims in this case (supra paras. 265 to 274). VII-4 RIGHT TO PERSONAL LIBERTY OF JUDGE CHÉVEZ DE LA ROCHA 443 In this regard, expert witness Ibáñez indicated that “these types of formula, which are very open formulas, call for very rigorous case law. I consider that this should be of a hard and fast nature, in which case law is used and there is a basic agreement on these fundamental principles, [… so as] not [to resort] to the private morals of the person who at a certain moment exercises the discipline.” Expert opinion provided by Perfecto Andrés Ibáñez during the public hearing held in this case.