CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE A.A. CANÇADO TRINDADE * 1. I have voted in favor of this judgment that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has just adopted in Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala and, in this Separate Opinion, I would like to add some brief personal observations in firm support of the Court’s characterization of the absolute prohibition of torture, in all its forms (including psychological) as belonging to the sphere of international jus cogens. This characterization is rooted in the evolution of the most lucid contemporary juridical thought, which – among the progress made in recent years towards combating particularly serious human right violations – has even led to the emergence of a real international juridical regime against torture. 2. This juridical regime is composed of the different international instruments and procedures for the prohibition of torture. To the United Nations Conventions (of 1984 and its Optional Protocol of 2002) and the Inter-American Convention (1985) on this issue, must be added the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (1987), the Special Rapporteur on the question of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (since 1985) of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, and the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (since 1991) of the same Commission on Human Rights (attentive to the prevention of torture). The three co-existing conventions to combat torture – that of the United Nations of 1984, the Inter-American of 1985, and the European of 1987 – more than simply being compatible, are complementary. 3. The first two (that of the United Nations and the Inter-American) include a definition of torture, while the third (the European) abstains from defining it. In this judgment in Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala, the Court refers to the elements that constitute the definition of torture in both Conventions – that of the United Nations and the Inter-American (para. 90-91) – when establishing, in this case, the occurrence of psychological torture against the victim, in violation of Article 5(1) and (2) of the American Convention. The Court has stated clearly that: “(...) The prohibition of torture is absolute and non-derogable, even in the most difficult circumstances, such as war, the threat of war, the fight against terrorism, and any other crime, martial law or state of emergency, civil war or commotion, suspension of constitutional guarantees, internal political instability, or any other public disaster or emergency” (para. 89). 4. The Inter-American Court’s observation is opportune, because, even for States that have not ratified the American Convention or any of the three conventions against torture (supra), it would be inadmissible to try and elude or relativize the peremptory or absolute nature of the prohibition of torture (even in the so-called “fight against terrorism,” or any other crime). In Soering v. United Kingdom (Judgment of July 7, 1989), the European Court of Human Rights affirmed categorically that the absolute prohibition – even in time of war and other national emergencies – of torture and of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or treatment, in the terms of article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, revealed that this provision incorporated one of the “fundamental values of democratic societies,” 1 * This translations is awaiting its final revision by the author. 1 This value is also embodied in similar terms in other international instruments, such as the