241. The Commission argued that Article 8(2)(h) of the Convention was violated at three different times: i) when the 1996 Code of Criminal Procedure was in force and before the legislative amendments of 2006 and 2010; ii) after the amendments of Law No. 8503 of 2006; and iii) as a result of the amendments of Law No. 8837 of 2010. It considered that the violation occurred at the three stages due to the fact that the review procedure contemplated under domestic legislation is exceptional and has a different purpose than the dual conformity of a conviction, since it only applies when the judgment is already final, in order to correct possible cases of judicial error on aspects that had not been incorporated in the ordinary appeal stage. It also presented the following arguments. 242. First, it argued that, prior to the legislative amendments, the only remedy available under the 1996 Code of Criminal Procedure against a conviction that had not become final was the remedy of cassation. It explained that in the Herrera Ulloa case, the Court considered that at the time this remedy did not meet the requirement of breadth because it imposed a priori restrictions that did not allow for a comprehensive review of the issues debated and analyzed by the lower court. This remedy was neither effective nor accessible to ensure the right to appeal the judgment, since its admissibility was conditional upon certain assumptions related to the application of the rule, excluding factual and evidentiary issues. 347 It stated that, taking into account that the limitation came from the text of the applicable law, it was not necessary to delve into the specific allegations that the alleged victims raised in the cassation appeals, or into the response they received. 348 Therefore, it concluded that the State violated Article 8(2)(h) of the ACHR, in relation to the obligations established in Articles 1(1) and 2 thereof, to the detriment of all the alleged victims, except Jorge Martínez Meléndez, since the latter's convictions were issued after the legislative reforms of 2006 and 2010. 243. Secondly, it argued that the only modification of Law 8503 of 2006 to the cassation appeal regime was contained in Article 369 of the CCP, which included new grounds for appeal in paragraph “j) when the sentence has not been issued through due process or with opportunity for defense.” However, it explained that the inclusion of this reason failed to solve the central problem of the cassation appeal, that is, the exclusion of the possible assessment of factual and evidentiary issues analyzed by the trial court. According to the Commission, the rule did not modify in any way the rigorousness and formalism in the presentation of the challenge. Nor was the appeal for review modified in any essential way. Thus, it concluded that the State also violated Article 8(2)(h) of the Convention, in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2, to the detriment of Rafael Rojas Madrigal and Jorge Martínez Meléndez, who were convicted under Law 8503. 244. Third, it argued that Law 8837 of 2010 created the remedy of appeal of the judgment, among others, and its transitory provisions established two assumptions, namely: 1) for persons whose cassation appeals were rejected before the entry into force of the law, it was established that they could file, for one time only, review proceedings, and 2) for persons whose cassation appeals were pending resolution at the time of the entry into force of the law, it was established that they could request the conversion of the cassation appeal already 347 The Commission explained that under Article 443 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, an appeal in cassation could only proceed when the decision did not comply with or erroneously applied a legal precept, i.e., it was limited to the review of possible errors of law. In turn, Article 369 established a closed list of assumptions under which an appeal in cassation could proceed, which focused on the essential constituent elements of a sentence or on possible errors of law. In addition, Article 445 of the CCP required that at the time of filing the appeal, the legal provisions that were deemed to have been disregarded or erroneously applied must be precisely described. 348 In its final written arguments, it argued that it is not evident from any of the decisions that resolved the appeals filed that the courts had made an autonomous assessment of the facts and the criminal liability of the alleged victims separately from that carried out by the court of first instance, as required under Article 8(2)(h) of the Convention to guarantee double judicial conformity. 76