53 168. The State indicated that the right to contest judicial decisions did not form part of the dispute submitted by the Commission. However, it clarified that, with regard to the appeal for annulment filed on September 2, 1991, the Second Labor Court had stated that none of the causes established in article 1085 of the Code of Civil Procedure had been identified and, therefore, declared that nullification was not admissible. Furthermore, the Habeas Corpus and Amparo Law established that the appeal for annulment should be filed before the Supreme Court of Justice. In this regard, Mr. Lagos filed this appeal on August 26, 1992. The Constitutional and Social Chamber of the Supreme Court ruled on this remedy on March 15, 1993, declaring that annulment was not admissible. In light of the dismissal of the appeal for annulment, he should have filed the appeal for cassation in relation to the judicial decisions rejecting applications for amparo, and this appeal should have been filed within 15 days of the decision rejecting the application. The Third Specialized Civil Chamber’s ruling of June 24, 1997, determined that the time frame for filing the cassation had expired. And this was so because, even though the Court of Constitutional Guarantees was not functioning, those cassation appeals that had been filed opportunely at the time when the presumed victim should have filed his appeal, were decided by the Constitutional Court years later. Regarding the appeals filed by Mr. Lagos del Campo before the Social and Constitutional Law Chamber and the Supreme Court, the State argued that the appeal for review and reconsideration was not established in Peruvian legislation in the context of labor proceedings; therefore, it was logical to conclude that the filing of an appeal that was not established by law was inherently inadmissible and the same could be said for the appeals filed on March 30 and April 28, 1993. In addition, the State underlined that, regarding the appeals filed after July 1996, these “were not established by law or were subject to the statute of limitations; therefore, it was foreseeable that they would be ineffective.” The State indicated that many of the appeals filed had serious flaws in their elaboration and with regard to compliance with procedural requirements; in other words, they were preordained to be declared inadmissible immediately […].” 169. The Commission did not address this matter. B. Considerations of the Court 170. The Court recalls that, with the second instance decision, the State annulled the judgment of the lower court and declared that Mr. Lagos del Campo’s dismissal was “justified.” Consequently, he had recourse to different courts in order to assert his rights (supra paras. 63 to 70). In this regard, the dispute in this section consists in determining whether Mr. Lagos del Campo had access to justice to protect his labor rights, in particular the right to job security in light of his dismissal, a right recognized in the State’s domestic laws. 171. In the instant case, although, before this Court,236 the representatives have alluded to the absence of a remedy to contest the final judgment under Article 8 of the Convention, the Court finds that, based on the iura novit curia principle (supra, para. 139), the said arguments relating to the appeals made following the final decision of the Second Labor Court, should be analyzed in light of Articles 8 and 25 (access to justice) of the American Convention. 172. In this regard, the Court notes that the facts relating to this analysis have been aired constantly starting with the domestic proceedings237 and as of the very first petitions before the It should be noted that, before the Commission, they alleged violations of Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention; However, in the Admissibility Report, the IACHR declared Article 25 inadmissible, considering that “it d[id] not have enough evidence to infer an alleged characterization of violations of Articles 24 and 25 of the Convention.” 236 The labor dispute is evident from the complaint he filed before the Labor Court. In his compliant, he indicated that “since the unfair and unjustified nature of the dismissal is well-known […], [he] ask[ed] the court […] to order the suspension of the dismissal and [his] reinstatement in [his] usual job.” 237