4 comprehensively and collectively, without any hierarchy, and enforceable in all cases before the competent authority.18 In other words, the judgment recognizes that a reciprocal dependency exists between all human rights, which has been incorporated into the international framework of human rights, without establishing a hierarchy or subsuming some rights in the content of others.19 10. Thus, to derive job security as part of the right to work using Article 26 of the American Convention, the Inter-American Court considered four aspects of special relevance. The first, relating to the rights that may be protected by Article 26 of the American Convention, which are those derived or identified from the economic, social, educational, scientific and cultural standards contained in the OAS Charter. In particular, for the purposes of the case of Lagos del Campos, the Inter-American Court considered that Article 34(g), Article 45(b) and (c), and Article 46 of the OAS Charter establish various aspects of the right to work.20 Thus, Article 26 contains social rights and is not a mere programmatic norm as some believe. In this regard, I would like to reproduce part of my Concurring Opinion to the judgment in the Case of Yarce et al. v. Colombia:21 19. A recurring argument to try and deny the Inter-American Court’s jurisdiction in relation to the “rights” established in Article 26 is based on an understanding that this article does not truly establish “rights,” but merely the commitment to “progressive development”; in other words, a programmatic objective. I consider that this perspective is limited in light of the protection that the inter-American system should provide, and therefore do not share this view for different reasons. 20. First, according to the text of Article 26, the commitment to progressive development refers to “rights,” according to the literal meaning of the article; that is, the obligation could only be established in relation to “rights,” so that it is essential to deduce that the article refers to “rights” and not to mere objectives. 21. This understanding accords with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which requires that a treaty be interpreted “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”22 Thus, it is evident that an understanding in good faith of the word “rights” included in the said Article 26, that is “in accordance with the ordinary meaning” of the term, indicates that it refers to actual “rights,” of the same nature as the other “rights” mentioned in the American Convention. This is corroborated when noting that Article 26 is the only article of Chapter III entitled “Economic, Social and 18 Cf. Case of Lagos del Campo v. Peru, supra, para. 141. I have been referring to “interdependence and indivisibility” as an inseparable duo in my separate opinions in previous cases. Cf. Concurring opinion in the Case of Yarce et al. v. Colombia, supra, paras. 13 to 15; Concurring opinion in the Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador, supra, para. 24. Also, see Resolution 32/130 of the United Nations General Assembly of September 16, 1977, paragraph 1(a); Declaration on the Right to Development, General Assembly Resolution 41/128, of December 4, 1986, para. 10 of the Preamble and Art. 6; Limburg Principles, 1986, especially No. 3, and the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1997, particularly, No. 3. 19 20 Case of Lagos del Campo v. Peru, supra, para. 143. 21 Concurring opinion with regard to the Case of Yarce et al. v. Colombia, supra, paras. 19 to 26. Articles 31 and 32, on the interpretation of treaties, establish: Article 31: “General rule of interpretation. 1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.” Article 32: Supplementary means of interpretation: Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” 22