3. In this case, as in the case of Casa Nina v. Peru, the position of the Court regarding the stability of judges and prosecutors 2, in the position is reiterated, without considering the close relationship that this standard has with the limitations on political rights considered in Article 23(2) of the Convention and the restrictive nature assigned to them in case law. In this sense, the Court once again failed to explain the legal arguments on which the difference in treatment is based on the form of appointment in relation to the right of public officials to remain in office under conditions of equality, and the procedural mechanisms through which continuation in the office is conventionally admitted. 4. The Court held “that the guarantee of stability and tenure in office, for judges and prosecutors, […] implies, in turn, (i) that the removal from their positions must exclusively obey the grounds permitted, either through a process that complies with judicial guarantees or because they have completed the term of their mandate; (ii) that judges and prosecutors can only be dismissed for serious misconduct or incompetence; and (iii) that all proceedings must be decided in accordance with the established norms of judicial behavior and through fair procedures that ensure objectivity and impartiality according to the Constitution or the law”.” 3 Thus, the Court considered that public officials who hold the status of judges and prosecutors, can be removed from office by any authority and in a process whose nature is not defined under the convention, provided that it respects the guarantees of Article 8 of the Convention and refers to serious disciplinary offenses. 5. On the contrary, in relation to the same matter (removal of a public official from office), in the decision of the case of Petro Urrego v. Colombia, the Court held that “[…]Article 23(2) of the American Convention clarifies that this instrument does not allow any administrative body to apply a sanction involving a restriction (for example, imposing a sanction of disqualification or dismissal) on a person for social misconduct (in the performance of public service or outside of it) on the exercise of their political rights to elect and be elected. This may only occur through a judicial act (judgment) by a competent judge in the corresponding criminal proceedings.” 4 Thus, the Court assumed a position according to which officials elected by popular vote can only be limited in their political rights by removal from office, through a judgment issued by a competent judge in criminal proceedings. 6. Consequently, I consider that it is evident that the Court has given a differentiated treatment to public officials by reason of the form of appointment, with regard to the limitations to their political rights admissible under the convention. However, when referring to administrative officials elected by popular vote (Case of Petro Urrego and Case of López Mendoza), or when referring to judicial or fiscal officials elected directly or through public competition (Case of Cuya Lavy and Case of Casa Nina, among others), Cf. Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 5, 2015. Series C No. 302, and Case of Rico v. Argentina. Preliminary Objections and Merits. Judgment of September 2, 2019. Series C No. 383. 3 Case of Cuya Lavy et al. v. Peru. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 28, 2021. Para. 129. 4 Case of Petro Urrego v. Colombia. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 8, 2020. Series C No. 406. Para 96. 2