2 A. Meaning and scope of the individual opinion With regard to the first aspect, it should be noted that, under the provisions of Article 65(2) of the Court’s Rules of Procedure, 8 this opinion refers solely and exclusively to the reasons why I consider that the judgment should have admitted the preliminary objection concerning the lack of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies filed by the State and, consequently, must refrain from commenting on the merits of the case. Therefore, this opinion essentially refers to the second operative paragraph of the judgment. Obviously, and for the same reason mentioned above, it is not appropriate to consider in this opinion the acts subsequent to the petition and the State's response thereto, that is, what is alleged during the admissibility stage and even more so, before the Court. This is because the purpose of this document is to point out the legal reasons why I disagree with the judgment regarding the obligation to comply with the rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies and the time at which this must occur. Thus, any reference in this opinion to subsequent acts is only for the purpose of clarifying the argument that is put forward and in no way implies entering into the merits of the case or making an appraisal of those acts. Nevertheless, I wish to state for the record that, as in other cases 9, I have participated in both the deliberation and the voting by the Court on each operative paragraph of the judgment, but have done so without issuing a separate opinion on them. Indeed, under the provisions of the Court's Rules of Procedure, a judge is only obliged to explain the reasons for an opinion in the event that he exercises the right to join such opinion to the judgment. Consequently, this obligation does not cover situations in which the judge decides not to attach his dissenting opinion to the judgment. In the instant case, therefore, I exercise my right to join my dissenting opinion to the judgment, exclusively with regard to the aforementioned second operative paragraph. Now, without prejudice to the foregoing, I wish to state for the record that I have voted against all the other operative paragraphs of the judgment, except for three, because I respectfully consider that the Court's refusal to accept the objection filed by the State constitutes, in itself and from now on, a comment on the merits of the case. Furthermore, I consider that, had I voted in favor of the aforementioned operative paragraphs, this would have been inconsistent with the position I adopted in accepting the preliminary objection concerning failure to comply with the rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies and that, therefore, it was not appropriate to comment on the merits of the case. With regard to the last three operative paragraphs of the judgment, i.e. paragraphs 16, 17 and 18, which I voted in favor of, I did so because they relate to procedural aspects of compliance with the judgment, namely, the reimbursement of a sum of money to the Victims’ Legal 8 See footnote No. 1. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Eduardo Vio Grossi, Case of Wong Ho Wing v. Peru, Judgment of June 30, 2015 (Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs); Dissenting Opinion of Judge Eduardo Vio Grossi, Case of Cruz Sánchez et al. v. Peru, Judgment of April 17, 2015 (Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs); Dissenting Opinion of Judge Eduardo Vio Grossi, Case of Liakat Ali Alibux v. Suriname, Judgment of January 30, 2014 (Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs), and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Eduardo Vio Grossi, Case of Díaz Peña v. Venezuela, Judgment of June 26, 2012 (Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs). 9