threats and harassment as of September 1996 and “in the second half of 1997,” as well as the facts presented by the Commission about what happened on October 3, 5 and 6, 1997. d) Those described by the representative in the sections entitled “Richard Velez,” “First stage of family life in the United States (New York): September 1998-February 2007,” “Second stage of life in the United States (Greenville, South Carolina and New York): March 2007 - June 2011” and “Individual Harm.”54 These alleged facts seek to clarify and provide details of the information provided by the Commission in the factual framework with regard to the events of October 9, 1997, when Mr. Vélez Restrepo was in the United States of America separated from his family that was in Medellin; the granting of asylum by the United States authorities, and the subsequent family reunion in 1998, as well as how these events have supposedly affected them psychologically; the repercussions on the professional careers of Mr. Vélez Roman and Mrs. Román Amariles; the financial difficulties they have had to face in order to survive in the United States, and the distance from their next of kin who live in Colombia. 56. Lastly, based on its case law (supra para. 47), the Court considers inadmissible Colombia’s intention that the Court should not analyze the representative’s classification of what happened to Mr. Vélez Restrepo on October 6, 1997, as an “attempted forced disappearance,” because the representative is not introducing a new fact. In its Merits Report, the Commission considered it proved that Mr. Vélez had suffered an “attempted kidnapping” on October 6, 1997. The representative is referring to that fact, but he gives it a different legal definition to the one proposed by the Inter-American Commission. Accordingly, in its analysis of the merits, the Court will rule on the representative’s allegation in relation to the legal definition of that fact and the alleged violation of Article 4 of the American Convention. 57. According to the above findings, the Court will not rule on the alleged contextual references and facts described by the representative that are not part of the factual framework of this case (supra paras. 51 to 54) and, consequently, it will not rule on the allegations regarding violations of the American Convention in relation to those facts. As indicated, the Court will rule on or take into consideration those facts that explain, clarify or reject the facts presented by the Inter-American Commission, as indicated above.55 When determining the facts and ruling on their legal consequences, the Court will take into account the State's arguments concerning the absence or insufficiency of evidence on which the contextual references and facts are based. VI COMPETENCE 58. The Inter-American Court has competence to hear this case, pursuant to Article 62(3) of the Convention, because Colombia has been a State Party to the American Convention since July 31, 1973, and accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court on June 21, 1985. 54 Paragraphs 94 to 145, which form part of the chapter of the pleadings and motions brief entitled “Forced separation of the Velez Roman family: October 1997 – September 1998” (merits file, tome I, folios 130 to 137). 55 Cf. Case of Barbani Duarte et al. v. Uruguay. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 13, 2011. Series C No. 234, para. 41. 21