7 conscience. Also, an evaluation together with other evidentiary doctors must be made, as established in the Legislative Decree No. 922 that was not questioned by the Constitutional Tribunal.” “[T]he orthodox position assumed by those accused of terrorism makes it absurd [to think] that a judgment in the Military Jurisdiction and the evidence obtained is null,” in such a form that “no fact would exist to be judged by the State of Peru and with less basis to condemn, with which the State would be lacking in its duty to preserve the Nation.” 14. For its part, the representative indicated that the State “in a covert method, criminalized the act of being a doctor by [identifying it] as an element of the definition of the crime of affiliation to [a] terrorist organization and its voluntary carrying out, which is neither sporadic nor circumstantial.” It added that in International Humanitarian Law, it does not exist “any qualification that refers to the act of being a doctor in an isolated or not isolated or circumstantial or non-circumstantial manners” and that the accusation of Mrs. De La Cruz Flores refers to “two concrete facts, medical attention to one Mario, medical attention to one Kike,” and that this is “the reiteration, the continuation, of the offering of medical assistance that the Peruvian State is referring to.” In this manner, they emphasized that “the State has not presented specific evidence in the case file that does not refer to acts of a medical nature supposedly carried out by Mrs. De La Cruz.” 15. According to the representative, “[t]he use of a criminal process of evidence obtained in an irregular manner to convict persons takes away independence from the [J]udicial [P]ower.” It added that the judgments issued in the second process “are sustained, among other elements, on evidence obtained in the framework of the initial process made before faceless judges,” while the Inter-American Court “declared in its [J]udgment that none of the acts made in the process can be considered compatible with the American Convention.” It added that “the evidence used by the State to convict Mrs. De La Cruz is not new evidence [and that] the only new evidence in [the] second process was the testimony of Mrs. Aroni Apcho during the oral trial [in which she] retract[s] from her incriminatory testimony and the declaration of a supposed beneficiary of the medical attention of Mrs. De La Cruz Flores in 1989,” in which she “deni[ed] having received said attention from Mrs. De La Cruz.” The representative signaled that “the Chamber [itself] has admitted […] the various contradictions” in the testimony of Mabel Mantilla Moreno, who had affirmed that “apparently [Mrs. De La Cruz Flores] made [an] operation,” incurring in this way a “doubtful version.” Regarding the key witness A2230000001, it indicated that his accusation “[was] not corroborated with other evidentiary elements.” Finally, facing the content of the testimony of said witnesses, the representative emphasized that the victim “never has had the specialty of surgery.” 16. The Commission signaled that “the facts based upon which the internal judicial authority establishes that the victim is part of the Sendero Luminoso are surgical interventions, healings and the provision of medical treatment, which are medical acts.” Also, according to the Commission, “the argument through which the Supreme Court of Justice tries to justify that it fits within the Judgment of the Inter-American Court is that the medical acts are repeated and that the information comes from the same [terrorist] organization.” Before this, the Commission signaled that the judgment of the InterAmerican Court “did not make […] a difference between the medical acts of emergency or repeated medical acts, [but] it raises the issue that the medical act is not only an illicit activity but a duty in certain circumstances, and therefore, it is not susceptible to a criminal sanction.” On the other hand, the Commission indicated that “[the] prohibition [of the penalty for medical acts] is not equivalent to immunity in favor of the health professionals who, like any other persons, can be criminally persecuted if they carry out illegal conduct.” For the Commission, what happened in the present case is that “the Peruvian authorities considered as proven the occurrence of a crime – the belonging of Mrs. De La Cruz Flores to a terrorist organization in different levels – using a series of medical acts as the supporting facts. In the absence of other concrete facts that may accredit the belonging of Mrs. De La Cruz Flores to a terrorist organization, the decision of the National Chamber of Terrorism and the Supreme Court of Justice constitute a new criminalization of acts of a medical nature.”