harm to the correct administration of justice, […] risk undermining the independence of the judiciary.”85 77. In this case, the Court finds that the disciplinary proceeding against Mr. Cordero Bernal were conducted pursuant to the procedure established in the Constitution and the law and based on legally established grounds. These grounds were of an open nature and related to a serious act that compromised the dignity of the office. The Court reiterates that the precision of a disciplinary norm may differ from that required by the principle of legality in criminal matters, owing to the nature of the disputes that each one is called on to decide.86 Therefore, the problems of the imprecision of a disciplinary offense cannot be examined in abstract, but rather in light of the grounds established by the judge when applying it. In the Court’s opinion, the application of an open disciplinary offense does not constitute, in principle, a violation of the right to due process, provided that the relevant jurisprudential parameters are respected. 78. Accordingly, the Court has established that the rules for the disciplinary prosecution of judges must seek to protect the judicial function by evaluating the performance of the judges in the exercise of their functions. Accordingly, “when applying open or indeterminate disciplinary norms that require considering concepts such as the decorum and the dignity of the administration of justice, it is essential to take into account the effects that the conduct examined could have on the exercise of the judicial function, either positively by the establishment of normative criteria for its application, or by means of an adequate interpretation and statement of reasons by the judges when applying them. To the contrary, the scope of these disciplinary measures would be subject to the private of moral beliefs of the judges.”87 Accordingly, in the absence of normative criteria that guide the conduct of the judge, the statement of reasons of the sanctioning ruling clarifies open or indeterminate disciplinary offenses. Therefore, to determine whether, in a specific case, judicial independence has been violated owing to the dismissal of a judge based on the application of an open disciplinary offense, the Court has found it necessary to examine the substantiation of the decision imposing a disciplinary sanction on a judge.88 79. Regarding the obligation to provide a statement of reasons for a decision, the Court has indicated repeatedly that this “is the externalization of the reasoned justification that allows a conclusion to be reached”89 and entails a rational presentation of the grounds that led the judge to take a decision.90 The obligation to substantiate decisions is a guarantee that UN Doc. A/HRC/26/32, April 28, 2014, paras. 84 and 87. Available at: https://undocs.org/A/HRC/26/32. Human Rights Council. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul. Mission to El Salvador. UN Doc. A/HRC/23/43/Add.1, para. 76. Available at: https://undocs.org/ A/HRC/23/43/Add.1. 85 Cf. Case of Urrutia Laubreaux v. Chile. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 27, 2020. Series C No. 409, para. 129, and Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 5, 2015. Series C No. 302, para. 257. 86 87 Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras, supra, para. 273. In this regard, in the Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras, this Court noted that: “as indicated by expert witness Ibáñez, ‘it is impossible to codify all assumptions’ in disciplinary matters, so that ‘ultimately, there must always be a relatively open clause concerning professional duties.’ However, in these assumptions and when open or indeterminate disciplinary offenses are used, it is fundamental to provide a statement of reasons when applying them, because it is incumbent on the disciplinary court to interpret these norms respecting the principle of legality and observing the greatest rigor when verifying the existence of punishable conduct.” Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras, supra, para. 270. 88 Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez. v. Ecuador. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 21, 2007. Series C No. 170, para. 107, and Case of Rosadio Villavicencio v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 14, 2019. Series C No. 388, para. 154. 89 90 Cf. Case of Amrhein et al. v. Costa Rica. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of 20