25. The State, in its final written arguments, included some considerations on the reception of the presumed victim’s statement.17 The Court finds that the State’s arguments were not designed to question the admissibility of the statement, but rather to comment on the procedure itself and that, in any case, the State had not contested the evidentiary procedure at the proper procedural moment. Therefore, the presumed victim’s statement will be assessed together with the body of evidence. VI FACTS 26. According to the Inter-American Commission, the purpose of this case is the alleged violation of Mr. Cordero Bernal’s rights that presumably occurred in the context of a disciplinary proceeding that concluded with his dismissal as Fourth Criminal Judge of the city of Huánuco, Peru, in 1996. The dismissal procedure was the result of a decision in which Mr. Cordero Bernal granted unconditional release to two defendants. Taking into account the factual framework established in the Merits Report, the arguments presented by the parties and by the Commission, and the body of evidence, the Court will set forth the proven facts as follows: first, it will refer to (A) the legal framework applicable to disciplinary proceedings against judges in Peru in force at the time of the facts. Then, it will refer to (B) the appointment of Héctor Fidel Cordero Bernal as Fourth Criminal Judge of the city of Huánuco and (C) his decision to grant unconditional release to two defendants. Subsequently, it will refer to (D) the disciplinary proceedings; (E) the amparo procedure; (F) the criminal proceedings, and (G) the appeal for annulment in this matter. A. Legal framework applicable to disciplinary proceedings against judges in Peru in force at the time of the facts 27. The disciplinary proceeding applied to Mr. Cordero Bernal was regulated by the Organic Law of the Judiciary (Supreme Decree 017 of 1993), the Peruvian Constitution (December 1993), and the Organic Law of the National Council of the Judiciary (Law 26397 of 1994). 28. The Organic Law of the Judiciary of June 2, 1993, established that it corresponded to the Judiciary’s Office for Control of Judges to apply disciplinary sanctions to judges and paralegals, with the exception of the sanctions of separation and dismissal, which had to be proposed to the Executive Council of the Judiciary.18 As disciplinary sanctions, the law identified: admonition, fine, suspension, separation and dismissal, and indicated the cases in which each was applicable.19 Regarding suspension and dismissal, it stipulated: Article 210. SUSPENSION. Suspension is applicable to the judge or official against whom an arrest warrant has been issued, or charges have been brought requesting a prison sentence, in proceedings for an intentional offense. It is also applicable to the judge who has committed a serious act that, without being a crime, compromises the dignity of the office or devalues it in the opinion of the public or when the judge The State indicated its “disagreement with the statement (at the request of the RPV [representatives of the presumed victim]) that Mr. Cordero Bernal made during the videoconference and that resulted in moment of emotional tension when he answered the questions of his RPV and the State.” It also indicated that the procedure resulted in “a presentation that was ethically unnecessary for the presumed victim” in which the answers to the State’s questions could not be fully understood, so that the procedure did not comply with the purpose for which it had been proposed. Consequently, it asked the Court to consider “noting the health status of deponents, especially if there are indications that their health is deteriorated; it should also note whether their statement will really contribute to providing further information on the facts of the case.” 17 18 Cf. Article 106. Organic Law of the Judiciary, June 2, 1993 (evidence file, folio 1691). 19 Cf. Articles 206 to 211. Organic Law of the Judiciary, June 2, 1993 (evidence file, folio 1713). 8