63. The Commission argued that the guarantees established in Article 8 of the American Convention were not limited to criminal proceedings, but were also applicable to other types of proceedings, especially sanction proceedings, because these form part of the exercise of the State’s punitive powers. In this regard, it argued that, because the case refers to a process that resulted in a sanction of dismissal, the guarantees of due process were applicable in relation to the principle of judicial independence. It indicated that the said principle resulted in the enhanced guarantees that States should provide to judges in order to ensure their independence and that those guarantees included irremovability. 64. The Commission also argued that the decision imposing a disciplinary sanction on Mr. Cordero Bernal did not include a reasoning that proved his lack of competence and suitability, but “merely indicated that the decision issued […] was irrational and devoid of common sense.” It therefore considered that the State had violated the right to a duly substantiated decision in relation to the principle of judicial independence. Regarding the right to appeal the decision, it argued that this was also part of the right to due process in sanction proceedings and that “it entailed an examination of both the facts and law of the decision under appeal by a different and higher judge or court.” 65. In relation to political rights, the Commission indicated that, according to the American Convention, judges have a right to access public office in equal conditions and that when their tenure is affected, this violates Article 23, in relation to the principle of judicial independence established in Article 8(1) of the American Convention. 66. Lastly, with regard to the principle of legality, the Commission argued that the violation of this principle was revealed by the legal imprecision of the sanction applied to Mr. Cordero Bernal; by the failure to apply the law that was most favorable to his interests, and by the contradictions arising from the use of the same facts to substantiate the criminal proceedings and the administrative disciplinary proceeding. 67. The representatives stressed that the principle of judicial independence involved an adequate process of appointment, irremovability from office, and a guarantee against external pressure. They also reiterated the Commission’s arguments that the substantiation of the decision by which Mr. Cordero Bernal was dismissed did not meet the standards for judicial independence and political rights. Regarding the principle of legality, they argued that its violation arose from the breadth of the definition of the disciplinary offense; that a law existed that was more favorable to the interests of the presumed victim, and that both the disciplinary and the criminal proceedings were based on the same facts. 68. The State referred to the guarantees of irremovability from office and the prohibition to freely remove judges, and argued that such guarantees were in force, except in the case of conducts that were clearly open to censure – such as serious disciplinary offenses or incompetence – established in an objective and impartial disciplinary proceeding. It argued that, in this case, “the principle of judicial independence was respected because Mr. Cordero Bernal was dismissed […] owing to a disciplinary offense or incompetence, defined as an offense in the laws in force; in other words, in this case, he was not freely removed from office.” It also argued that the dismissal decision was sufficiently substantiated. 69. Lastly, with regard to the principle of legality, the State argued that the degree of precision required for a norm depended on the subject matter and that certain levels of indetermination did not necessarily entail a violation of the American Convention. It also indicated that there was no conflict between the two laws. Finally, it underlined that the text of the law that included the administrative sanction could not exclude criminal prosecution, 17