massacres contained in Article 4 of the Convention, in relation to Articles 1(1) and 19 thereof, for failing to comply with the obligation to both guarantee and respect rights in relation to the executions; and to declare the State responsible for the perpetration of acts of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of the victims of the massacre. Lastly, the representatives asked the Court, when delivering its judgment in this case, to “refer to the aggravated responsibility of the State because all the violations committed occurred in the context of a military strategy created and implemented by the State in extreme contradiction of the provisions of the American Convention and the principles that inspire it.” 135. In their final arguments the representatives alleged that the rape described constituted acts of torture by the State and, therefore, a violation of the right to personal integrity. 136. The representatives added that both the surviving presumed victims and the victims’ next of kin who were not present at the place of the massacre on the day they took place, had encountered absolute inactivity by the authorities who had failed to adopt any measure to clarify the events and also, for many years, they were forced to observe how the perpetrators of the alleged massacre were repeatedly honored by the State. In this regard, the representatives referred to “the feelings of anguish and impotence that all these facts ha[d] caused over the years” to the victims of the case, whose lives had been marked “by the abandonment and contempt of the State that, during the first years following the events, even denied that they had occurred and that, today, still has not investigated them or punished those responsible.” In their final arguments, the representatives alleged that the personal integrity of the survivors was violated, because some of them were unable to bury their families for fear of reprisals by the soldiers or owing to the condition of the bodies, and others were never able to recover the remains, which caused an incomplete mourning process. They also argued that the devastation of lands and crops, setting fire to them and destroying them, was a way of eliminating the identity of the victims. Consequently, they asked the Court to declare the State responsible for the violation of the right to integrity of the surviving victims of the massacre and of the next of kin of the executed victims, because they were subjected to profound suffering for years, owing to the different violations committed against them and their relatives. 137. The representatives agreed with the Commission and added that the State was directly responsible for the deprivation of the property of the victims, which is a continuing fact that persists today, because the State has not adopted a single measure to make sure that the victims in this case can recover their possessions. Consequently, they asked the Court to declare the State responsible for the violation of the right to property of all surviving victims of the massacres. In their final arguments, the representatives argued that, in view of the scale of the massacres, it was not possible to establish the possessions that were lost by each victim; however, since the destruction of property and homes was part of the operation’s modus operandi, they considered that “it can be established that all the victims, both those killed and the survivors, suffered a violation to their right to property.” In their final arguments, they argued that the burning down of the victims’ homes had also constituted a violation of Article 11 of the Convention, and asked the Court to declare that the State was responsible for the violation of the right to privacy and the rights of the family of the victims of the massacre. 138. The representatives asked the Court to declare that the State was responsible for the violation of the rights contained in Articles 11 and 22 of the American Convention, in relation to failure to comply with the obligations contained in Article 1(1) of this instrument. In this regard, they argue that, in this case, it would correspond to a continuing violation, which would subsist until the presumed victims were able to return to their place of origin or residence, which, in many cases, occurred after June 6, 1995, and, in some cases, had not occurred yet because, in addition to being directly responsible for the displacement of the presumed victims, the State had not taken measures to ensure respect for freedom of residence and movement or to make sure that the victims return to their place of origin. Thus, the representatives considered that, although the State had not directly restricted the freedom of movement and residence of the presumed victims of this case, the impossibility for them to return stemmed from the existence of circumstances created by the State itself, such as the impunity in which the facts remain. In 42