15 47) The State added that the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago is and was, at the moment of ratification of the Convention, compatible with the same. It argued that its “reservation” cannot be interpreted as contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention because the “reservation” is only related to the optional procedure contained in Article 62 of the Convention, which in no way affects the substantive rights guaranteed in the Convention. The purported “reservation,” as presented, it argued, does not restrict the obligations assumed by the State under the Convention in relation to individuals within its jurisdiction. 48) Trinidad and Tobago also maintained that, if the Court declares the State’s Article 62 “reservation” incompatible with the object and purpose of the American Convention, the effect of such a determination would be to render the State’s declaration accepting the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction null and void ab initio. 49) The State added that the International Court of Justice, in its Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1951), indicated that […] if a Party to the Convention objects to a reservation which it considers to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, it can in fact consider the reserving State is not a party to the Convention […] 50) The State indicated that, in its legal system, it is the Legislative Power that makes the laws. The Executive cannot, at the moment of ratification of a treaty, alter the laws of the Republic or create a constitutional breach. For this reason, the Executive, at the time of accession to the Convention and acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, formulated the “reservation” under Article 62. In this same manner, the State denounced the Convention in May of 1998, in virtue of the need to observe the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. 51) If the “reservation” of State were, for any reason, considered invalid, it would not mean that the State declared its unlimited acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. On the contrary, it is clear that the State never intended to accept, in its totality, the jurisdiction of the Court. If the “reservation” is invalid, then the declaration was invalid and the State never made a declaration. Arguments of the Commission 52) The Commission sustained that the impugned term in the State’s declaration of acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction should be considered invalid because it is impossible to determine its exact nature and scope. It is excessively vague and should not be interpreted in a manner that affects the Court’s jurisdiction to decide cases against the State. If a meaning is to be attributed, it should be interpreted in a manner that limits the legal effects of the Court’s judgments, and not the Court’s jurisdiction to decide cases against the State. 53) The Commission indicated that the United Nations Human Rights Committee has stated that reservations to human rights treaties must be specific and transparent so that courts, individuals under the jurisdiction of a reserving State, and other States parties can know which human rights obligations have or have not been undertaken. The term contained in the State’s “reservation” appears to modify the degree of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. However, a simple