13 days” as the equivalent of “three months” (paragraph 39) when referring to an argument of the Commission, and applied the two expressions synonymously (paragraph 43). Nevertheless, in that same case, the Court applied the criteria of three calendar months, as it is in paragraph 39 of that judgment, which applied a period of three months from October 17, 1991 to January 17, 1992 (if the period has been computed in days and not by the Gregorian calendar, ninetythree will have transpired). Also in the Neira Alegria et al. Case (Neira Alegría et al. Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of December 11, 1991. Series C No. 13, paras. 32-34), the Court applied the period of three months from June 11, 1990, to September 11, 1990 (three calendar months made up of ninety-three days). The Court decides that, in accordance with Article 51(1) of the American Convention, the Inter-American Commission has a period of three months from the transmission of the Report referred to in Article 50(1) of the Convention, to submit the case to the Court. The expression “period of three months” should be understood in its ordinary meaning. According to the Dictionary of the Royal Academy of the Spanish Language, “period” “[ is the] term or time indicated for something” and “month [is the] number of consecutive days from the one indicated to another of the same date in the following months.” Additionally, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Article 31(1)) considers in its rules of interpretation, the ordinary meaning of the words, as well as the context, and the object and purpose of the treaty8. 40) The Court finds it convenient to clarify, in light of the State’s arguments, that what took place on October 19, 2000 was a notification of the application (supra 16). Consequently, it should not be interpreted that the three-month time period stipulated in Article 51(1) of the Convention applies to the Court’s actions in the exercise of its own jurisdiction, as this emanates from the American Convention. Article 51(1) only refers to a limit for the submission of the application to the Court and does not directly relate to the Court’s actions relative to the determination of its jurisdiction. When the text of Article 51(1) says “its jurisdiction accepted”, this refers to the acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction on the part of the State, and not the Court’s actions in the exercise of its own jurisdiction. 41) For the foregoing considerations, the Court dismisses the first argument of the State’s preliminary objection, in which it refers to the timeliness of the application and the “acceptance of jurisdiction” on the part of the Court. B. LACK OF JURISDICTION OF THE COURT Arguments of the State 42) As previously stated by Trinidad and Tobago, the State deposited its instrument of adherence of the Convention on May 28, 1991, dated April 3, 1991, recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, but subjected this recognition to a “reservation”. The State’s “reservation” reads that 8 Paniagua Morales et al. Case. Preliminary Objections. Judgment of January 25, 1996. Series C No. 23, paras. 27-29.