international humanitarian law, and their character of crimes against humanity, because they took place in a context of systematic attacks on the civilian population. 205. Meanwhile, the State indicated that Operation Genesis was a legitimate military operation; that it was planned, prepared, executed and consolidated under the Constitution, observing the parameters defined by international humanitarian law during all its stages, and with the participation “exclusively [of] regular troops” members of the Colombian Military Forces.411 Similarly, the State indicated that Operation Genesis was planned, designed and implemented in accordance with international humanitarian law and “the use of force was addressed only and exclusively against military objectives that had been duly and carefully identified during its planning.” The State denied that this operation was the cause of the forced displacement of the inhabitants of the Cacarica River basin, because it was conceived to be executed […] in the areas of the basins of the Salaquí and Truando Rivers,” and not there; and also because the “forced exodus resulted from an illegitimate order given by the FARC.” 206. The State also argued that if it were established that the possible fear that might be caused by the legitimate use of force, and the decisions taken by the population based on that fear give rise to the international responsibility of the State, “it would be impossible for [the State] to comply not merely with its right, but with its obligation, to try and neutralize those who commit violent acts, and to combat crime.” 207. Furthermore, the State denied the assertion by the representatives of the presumed victims that a paramilitary strategy existed that was a generalized policy of Colombia. In this regard, it affirmed that it had never been the State’s policy to act in conjunction with the illegal self-defense groups, or allow or tolerate, by act or omission, their criminal activities. “The existence of the paramilitary movement, and its unfortunate and casuistic connivance with some members of the State’s Armed Forces have been recognized previously by the Court […], but in none of those cases did the Court consider that the State had an institutional policy addressed at encouraging or strengthening the illegal self-defense groups.” 208. The State also indicated that, in this case, the circumstances of a systematic pattern alleged by the Commission were not present, and that the expression “crime against humanity” could not be understood unless it was “to assess the legal consequences of the violations that have been alleged in the case and that, therefore, this assessment lacks legal consequences as regards the domestic criminal investigations that are underway.”412 209. Regarding the death of Mr. López Mena, the State affirmed that “this deplorable act, the authorship of which has been claimed by those demobilized from the illegal self-defense groups […] bears no relationship to, and even less is associated with, the process of planning, preparation and execution of Operation Genesis.” It also asserted that “there is no evidence based on which it can be inferred that [regular troops took part] in the execrable murder of Marino López Mena” or that the forced displacement of the inhabitants of the Cacarica River basin can be attributed to this. Furthermore, the State indicated that it cannot be held internationally responsible for the violation of his right to life because it was not State agents who murdered him, neither was it State agents who gave the order to kill him, and “above all, State agents were not present on the day the events occurred.”413 411 It also observed that “the operations carried out by the Air Force were executed exclusively over previously identified military objectives; they sought to neutralize illegal armed groups that were undermining public order, and were thus in keeping with the constitutional mandate and the goal of protecting the civilian population and its property.” 412 It added that, according to “the Court’s case law, in order to affirm the existence of (and even to characterize) a pattern, it is not sufficient to argue that there was generalized violence or that this violence was perpetrated against members of one group.” It indicated that it was “necessary to establish a very specific moment and a modus operandi for the conducts, which clearly did not occur in this case.” 413 In this regard, it underlined that the judgment delivered by the Eighth Criminal Court of the Bogota Special Circuit on August 23, 2012, indicated that “the acts were committed only and exclusively by members of the illegal selfdefense groups or paramilitary groups, without any type of collaboration or acquiescence by Colombian State agents.” 74