210. In this regard, it indicated that the theory of the international responsibility of the State is based on customary law, even in relation to human rights, and that “the risk theory according to which the State responds merely because it is the State, has no legal basis.”414 Freedom of movement and residence 211. The Commission and the representatives argued that, as a result of the bombing during ‘Operation Genesis,’ the paramilitary incursions in the Cacarica river basin, and the acts of violence that occurred in this context, which included the torture and death of Marino López, as well as the threats made by the paramilitaries against the civilian population, the Afrodescendant communities, and especially the women and children, the population was obliged to forcibly displace. Accordingly, the State was responsible for the violation of Articles 2, 5 and 17 of the Convention in relation to Articles 11(1), 19, 22 and 24 of this instrument. 212. The Commission emphasized that the State had incurred international responsibility for the forced displacement on two different but interrelated levels: for its active role in originating it, and for the failure to provide an adequate and effective response following it. 213. The representatives affirmed that the State had “severely violated the right to freedom of movement of the victims of this case,” based on “three fundamental elements to establish this responsibility”: (a) the “absolute restriction of freedom of movement of the members of the communities on the days when the paramilitaries and the soldiers carried out the incursion in the Cacarica river basin”; (b) “the massive forced displacement of the communities of the Cacarica, originated by the State itself by the action of the Armed Forces and the paramilitary strategy, which it directed towards Turbo,” and (c) the fact that the “State has not taken measures to ensure the integral return of the communities to their territories, and to their family and community life.” 214. The representatives asked that the Court bear in mind the “State’s responsibility in light of international humanitarian law […] in accordance with the obligations to respect and to ensure” under Article 29 of the Convention; the aggravated responsibility of the State because the facts took place within a “pattern of systematic violence against the civilian population that severely affected a human group in a situation of evident vulnerability,” and because the investigation into the facts “has not been conducted in keeping with the standards of due diligence.” Lastly, the representatives also considered that the facts of this case should be classified as crimes against humanity, insofar as “there was a plan to commit a systematic attack against the Afro-descendant communities that inhabit the Cacarica River basin.” 215. The State affirmed its “rejection and disagreement with the position of the Commission and of the representatives indicating that [the State] had the overall and abstract responsibility for the existence of the illegal armed groups, known as self-defense or paramilitary groups.” It also underscored the “absence of evidence” that would prove “the causal nexus between the displacement alleged by the ‘victims’ and the events that occurred between February 24 and 27, 1997, at the time of Operation Genesis”. Nevertheless, and as an example of the efforts made to attend to and resolve the phenomenon of displacement in the region, the State outlined “a series of measures, actions and policies implemented in good faith as a result of what happened and that included monitoring the return to the Cacarica region of the displaced communities that had settled in Turbo, Bahía Cupica and Bocas del Atrato.” On this basis, it concluded that “the forced displacement of the inhabitants of the Cacarica cannot be attributed to the State, because, as described, the civilian population was not, and is not, an objective of operations undertaken by the Colombian Armed Forces.” 414 The State mentioned that, although there is a first instance judgment convicting General Rio for the crime against Marino Lopez, “this is based on the theory of the ‘command responsibility’ in an organized power structure,” which “supposes that the accused is part of the criminal organization, not that the criminal organization acted ‘under the instructions or direction and control of the State’”; thus it considered that, “in any case, the murder of Marino Lopez would be only and exclusively the responsibility of those who are sentenced and convicted, when the case is res juzgata, and their conduct could never give rise to the international responsibility of the State.” 75