opens the door of uncertainty with respect to the catalogue of justiciable rights before the Court, which affects the legitimacy of its acts. II.2 Content of the Protocol of San Salvador Articles 76(1) and 77(1) of the Convention 12 set forth the system accepted by the States to modify what had been agreed upon, be it by amendment or by an additional protocol. It was by the latter that the “Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, “Protocol of San Salvador” of 1988 (hereinafter “the Protocol”) was adopted with the purpose of progressively including other rights and freedoms within the protective regime of the Convention. Notwithstanding that the Protocol recognizes and develops a group of ESCER in its text, 13 Article 19(6), on the Means of Protection, gives the Court jurisdiction to hear eventual violations with regard to only two rights: trade union rights and the right to education. That provision establishes that, in any situation in which those rights “are violated by action directly attributable to a State Party to this Protocol may give rise, through participation of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and, when applicable, of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, to application of the system of individual petitions governed by Article 44 through 51 and 61 through 69 of the American Convention on Human Rights.” Thus, according to the treaty (comprised of two instruments: the Convention and the Additional Protocol), 14 the Court lacks jurisdiction to declare an autonomous right to work. As I have argued previously, I reaffirm that the lack of the direct justiciability of ESCER before the Court does not imply not recognizing their existence; nor the enormous importance of those rights; nor the interdependent and indivisible nature that they have with respect to civil and political rights; nor that they lack protection or that they must not be protected. It is the States’ duty to enable the individual’s autonomy to be made a reality, which implies that he or she can count on access to the primary goods (broader than those defined within the political philosophy of John Rawls) 15 that would enable the development of his or her capabilities; in other words, access to economic, social and cultural rights. 16 It is then necessary to distinguish two levels – related but different. One is on the national level where, by means of democratic procedures, the citizenry decides to include ESCER in their respective juridical order and to incorporate international law on the matter, as occurs in the vast majority of the member states of the interAmerican system of human rights. In that context, it is the national courts that within their jurisdictions– exercise their powers on the interpretation and justiciability of those rights, in conformity with their constitutions and laws. Article 76(1): “Proposals to amend this Convention may be submitted to the General Assembly for the action it deems appropriate by any State Party directly, and by the Commission or the Court through the Secretary General.”. Article 77(1): “In accordance with Article 31, any State Party and the Commission may submit proposed protocols to this Convention for consideration by the States Parties at the General Assembly with a view to gradually including other rights and freedoms within its system of protection.” 13 The right to work, just, equitable and satisfactory conditions of work, trade union rights, right to social security, to health, to a healthy environment, to food, to education, to the benefits of culture, to the formation and protection of families, of children, to the protection of the elderly and to the protection of the handicapped (sic). 14 According to Article 2(a) of the Vienna Convention, a treaty may consist in a single instrument or two or more related instruments. 15 For RAWLS primary goods are a group of goods necessary “for formulating and executing a rational plan of life,” such as liberty, opportunities, income, wealth and self-respect, “Theory of Justice” (1995:393). 16 PÉREZ GOLDBERG, “Las mujeres privadas de libertad y el enfoque de capacidades” (2021:94-109). 12 4