Kimel had indicated – and this is why he was prosecuted – that the federal judge who was heard the case: Adopted all required steps and procedures. He collected the police reports containing the preliminary information, requested and obtained forensic and ballistics reports, and summoned to appear many of those who could provide information for the elucidation of the case. Notwithstanding, an examination of the judicial record raises an initial question: Did the authorities actually intend to discover indications that might lead to the perpetrators? Under the military dictatorship judges were normally acquiescent, if not accomplices to the dictatorial regime. In the case of the Pallotine Fathers, the judge […] complied with most of the formal requirements of the investigation, even though it is evident that a number of decisive elements that could have shed light on the murder were not taken into account. The evidence that the order to carry out the murder had originated within the military structure in power paralyzed the investigation, bringing it to a standstill. 256 136. In that case, the Court concluded that the criminal provisions concerning defamation and libel had been deficient, because the said “lack of precision” did not allow the prohibited conducts in the analytical statements for which Mr. Kimel had been accused to be determined with exactitude and, in addition, the grounds for considering Mr. Kimel’s criticisms wrongful or illegal were not sufficiently foreseeable. 257 In order to illustrate the effect that the said “lack of precision” had on Mr. Kimel’s freedom of expression, the Court underscored that, in that case, the victim had been sentenced in first instance for defamation (injurias), acquitted in second instance, and convicted in cassation for the crime of libel (calumnia). 258 137. In this case, the situation is different from that of the Kimel case, because it was sufficiently foreseeable that certain statements and characterizations used by Messrs. Mémoli (in which the presumed victims accused the complainants as possible authors of or accessories to the offense of fraud, referred to them as “criminals,” “unscrupulous,” “corrupt” and said that they had “used subterfuges (tretas) and deceit (manganetas),” among other matters) could result in a judicial action for the alleged harm to the honor or reputation of the complainants. 138. In addition, the Court reiterates that Article 11(3) of the Convention, in combination with Article 11(2), establishes that “[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the law against [arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life] or [unlawful] attacks [on his honor or reputation].” Therefore, in compliance with this provision of the Convention, the recourse to judicial mechanisms to obtain protection against attacks on the honor and reputation of the individual, including the abusive exercise of freedom of expression that could harm the said rights, is a valid and legitimate measure under the American Convention (supra paras. 125 and 126). 139. Taking into account that the convictions imposed on Messrs. Mémoli were established by law and responded to an objective permitted in the Convention (the protection of the reputation of others), this Court notes that the said criminal sanctions complied with two of the requirements established in Article 13(2) of the Convention (supra para. 130). Regarding the third requirement (the need for the subsequently imposition of liability), the Court recalls that it does not find that criminal measures in relation to the imparting of information or opinions is contrary to the Convention (supra para. 126). However, as it has established in other cases, this possibility must be analyzed with special care, weighing up in this regard the extreme gravity of the conduct of the individuals imparting the information and opinions, the wilful intent in the way in which they acted, the characteristics of the harm unjustly caused, 256 Case of Kimel v. Argentina, supra, para. 42. 257 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina, supra, paras. 66, 67 and 128. 258 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina, supra, paras. 64 and 65. 54