and other information that reveals the absolute need to use, in a truly exceptional way, criminal measures. At all time, the burden of proof must fall on the party who makes the accusation. In this regard, the Court has taken note of the evolution of the case law of other courts aimed at promoting, with balance and rationality, the protection deserved by rights that are apparently in conflict, without weakening the guarantees that are required by freedom of expression as a bulwark of a democratic regime. 259 140. The Court also underscores that the international jurisdiction is of a contributing and complementary nature and, thus, the Court does not fulfill the functions of a court of “fourth instance.” 260 This means that the Court is not a higher court of a court of appeal to decide disagreements between the parties on some implications of the assessment of evidence or the application of domestic law in aspects that are not directly related to compliance with international human rights obligations. 261 The Court recognizes that, when examining compliance with certain international obligations, there may be an intrinsic interrelation between the analysis of international law and domestic law. However, in strict observance of its subsidiary competence, the Court considers that, in a case such as this one, it must verify whether the State authorities made a reasonable and sufficient weighing up between the two rights in conflict, without necessarily making an autonomous and independent weighing, unless the specific circumstances of the case require this. 141. The Court notes that the statements of Messrs. Mémoli were examined in detail by the domestic judicial authorities when deciding the criminal conviction against them. When reviewing the need to establish criminal sanctions against Messrs. Mémoli, the courts of both first and second instance examined thoroughly the characteristics of the statements made by Messrs. Mémoli based on which the complaint had been filed against them. In this regard, the Court notes that: (i) the convictions for defamation were the result of a detailed analysis of each of the interventions, exempting Messrs. Mémoli of responsibility for statements considered “opinions that did not disparage the complainants” 262 and holding them responsible for statements included in the said interventions that, in the understanding of the domestic judicial authorities, had exceeded a simple opinion or analysis of the news, with the purpose of disparaging or defaming one or several of the complainants or, for example, constituted “a voluntary digression to insult them,” without being “necessary or essential for the claim made” (supra paras. 77 to 82 and 87); (ii) the domestic courts verified the existence of animus injuriandi or malice as regards the statements for which they were convicted; (iii) they acquitted the presumed victims for most of the interventions based on 259 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina, supra, para. 78, citing: ECHR, Mamère v. France, no. 12697/03, § 27, ECHR 2006-XIII; Castells v. Spain, 23 April 1992, §§ 42 and 46, Series A no. 236, and Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre v. Romania [Grand Chamber], no. 33348/96, § 115, ECHR 2004-XI. 260 The Preamble to the American Convention states that the international protection “reinforce[es] or complement[s] the protection provided by the domestic law of the American States.” See also, The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights (arts. 74 and 75). Advisory opinion OC-2/82 of September 24, 1982. Series A No. 2, para. 31; The Word "Laws" in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights, supra, para. 26, Case of Velásquez Rodríguez vs. Honduras. Merits, supra, para. 61 and Case of Palma Mendoza et al. v. Ecuador. Preliminary objection and Merits. Judgment of September 3, 2012. Series C No. 247, para. 16. 261 Cf. Case of Nogueira de Carvalho et al. v. Brazil. Preliminary objections and merits. Judgment of November 28, 2006. Series C No. 161, para. 80, and Case of Palma Mendoza et al. v. Ecuador, supra, para. 16. 262 In this regard, see, for example, with regard to the radio program of May 4, 1990, the first instance court considered that four of the phrases for which Messrs. Mémoli were charged were “opinions on the topic, regarding which it cannot be said that they were disparaging,” while, with regard to the radio program of May 10, 1990, the first instance court considered that nine of the statements based on which the presumed victims were accused were “simple comments on opinions concerning a certain topic” and did not have a defamatory content (supra footnotes 108 and 111). 55