(iv) when acquitting them for these statements, the domestic courts distinguished that some of these statements constituted opinions or were of a hypothetical nature in order to exempt them from criminal liability for the offense of libel and defamation, or constituted “accounts of facts or “newspaper stories.” 18. It is important to underline that following the judgment in first instance (subsequently confirmed on appeal) that had rejected the existence of wilful intent in the case of the burial vaults, Pablo Mémoli published an article entitled “Caso Nichos: el Juez dijo que los boletos de compraventa son de objeto imposible e inválidos” [Burial vaults case: the judge said that the object of sales contracts is impossible and invalid], which included the following passage: “This newspaper, under the responsibility of its director, considered the act to be presumed fraud, and we continue to maintain this, because the case file reveals the fraud from the evidence provided by the accused who did not hesitate to be (mendacious) and (fallacious), before the courts themselves” (judgment, para. 81 and footnote 113). 19. In addition, it is clear that this case does not include any of the circumstances on which the prevalence attributed to freedom of expression was accorded in previous cases: a) The persons to whom the offensive statements referred were not public officials or public figures. The previous cases involved: a diplomat who represented Costa Rica before the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Herrera Ulloa), 10 the former Attorney General of Panama (Tristán Donoso), 11 a candidate for the Presidency of Paraguay (Ricardo Canese), 12 the judge who intervened in the case of the murder of the Pallotine Fathers or the San Patricio massacre during the Argentine dictatorship (Kimel) 13 or the President of Argentina (Fontevecchia and D’Amico). 14 b) The matters to which the incriminating statements referred were not of public interest, as they were in the preceding cases: supposed illegal activities (Herrera Ulloa); 15 revelation to third parties of a private telephone conversation and presumed unauthorized recording by the Attorney General (Tristán Donoso); 16 questioning of the integrity and suitability of a candidate for the Presidency by the Republic (Ricardo Canese, who was also a candidate for the Presidency), 17 failure by a judge to consider decisive evidence to elucidate the murder of several priests (Kimel), 18 or dissemination of photographs that presumably proved that the President of the Nation had a child from an extramarital relationship as a way of calling attention to the providing of large sums of money and expensive presents, and possibly other favors, by the then President to those who appeared in the photographs that were published (Fontevecchia and D’Amico). 19 c) “Excessive language” was used, contrary to the preceding cases, in particular in the Kimel case, in which the Court stated that “Mr. Kimel did not use excessive language and 10 Cf. Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 95.d). 11 Cf. Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panama, supra, para. 95. 12 Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay, supra, para. 69.1. 13 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina, supra, para. 89. 14 Cf. Case of Fontevecchia and D’Amico v. Argentina, supra, para. 60 15 Cf. Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 113. 16 Cf. Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panama, supra, para.76. 17 Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay, supra, para. 94. 18 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina, supra, para. 89. 19 Cf. Case of Fontevecchia and D`Amico v. Argentina, supra, paras. 62 to 64. 6