2 4. That was the first contentious case processed entirely under the Court’s new Rules of Procedure (adopted on November 24, 2000, and in force since June 1, 2001), which granted the petitioners locus standi in judicio during all stages of the proceedings before the Court. Now, a year and a half later, the Court’s Judgment in the Case of the “Juvenile Reeducation Institute” underscores the significance of the historic amendments that the Court introduced and that are now part of its current Rules of Procedure (paragraphs 106, 119-120, and 125) to protect the individual’s subjectivity [titularité] of protected rights by giving him locus standi in judicio in all phases of contentious proceedings before the Court. The “Street Children” and “Juvenile Reeducation Institute” cases are eloquent testimony of titularité, even in the most adverse circumstances. 5. As I underscored in my Concurring Opinion in the Case of the “Five Pensioners”, the Court correctly held that "the consideration which ought to prevail is that of the individuals being subjects of all the rights protected by the Convention, as the true substantive complaining party, and as subjects of the International Law of Human Rights." (paragraph 16). This was a "significant step forward taken by the Court, since the adoption of its present Regulations" (para. 17) inasmuch as the "assertion of the international juridical personality and capacity of the human being fulfills a true need of the contemporary international legal order" (para. 23). I added the following: In fact, the assertion of that juridical personality and capacity constitutes the truly revolutionary legacy of the evolution of the international legal doctrine in the second half of the XXth century. The time has come to overcome the classic limitations of the legitimatio ad causam in International Law, which have so much hindered its progressive development towards the construction of a new jus gentium. An important role is here being exercised by the impact of the proclamation of human rights in the international legal order, in the sense of humanizing [it]: those rights were proclaimed as inherent to every human being, irrespective of […] circumstances.4 The individual is a subject jure suo of International Law, and to the recognition of the rights which are inherent to him corresponds ineluctably the procedural capacity to vindicate them, at national as well as international levels. (paragraph 24). 6. More recently, in the case of the Gómez Paquiyauri Brothers vs. Peru (Judgment of July 8, 2004), I followed the same line of reasoning and stressed the point that the individuals’ titularité of all Convention-protected rights must trump all other considerations, as individuals are the subjects of the International Law of Human Rights” (para. 27). That development is a “direct consequence” of the step forward that the Court took upon adoption of its current Rules of Procedure, the fourth in its history. The amended Rules of Procedure grant individual petitioners locus standi in judicio for all phases of the proceedings before the Court (para. 27). Furthermore, as I have maintained in recent years, "we are in the midst of an historical process of consolidating the individual’s emancipation vis-à-vis his own State" (para. 28). 7. Six years ago, in my Concurring Opinion on the Court’s Judgment in Castillo Petruzzi et al. vs. Peru (Preliminary Objections, 1998), I described the “qualitative advance” that was needed under the American Convention: This means to seek to secure, not only the direct representation of the victims or their relatives (locus standi) in the procedure before the Inter-American Court in cases already forwarded to it by the Commission (...), but [also] the right of direct access of 4 IACtHR, Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child, August 28, 2002, Advisory Opinion OC17/02, operative paragraph 1, and Concurring Opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade, paragraphs 1-71.