47 relevance or authority. Another fundamental point has to do with “institutional totality or lack thereof” which concerns the question of whether the institution, within its walls, offered everything the minor could need; now, however, the opposite is the goal, because the Convention states that deprivation of liberty should only be used in exceptional cases, and then only as a “last resort” and “for the shortest appropriate period of time.” The reference in the international standards to preventive detention in these cases and to reasonable time periods is one of the most problematic aspects both from the normative standpoint and from the standpoint of judicial interpretation. Clearly, the notion of preventive detention as an anticipated form of punishment or as an exaggerated albeit temporary method of teaching a lesson still persists. Human rights are “evolving in the direction of specificity,” leaving less room for discretion and requiring more exacting language in the law. Experience has demonstrated that judicial discretion invariably works to the disadvantage of the weakest and least protected sectors. Therefore, judicial discretion has to be drastically reduced through a legislative technique that spells out precisely what conditions must be present in order for a juvenile to be lawfully deprived of his liberty. The measures that could be taken in a country to mitigate any harm done to a group of juveniles held under subhuman conditions would be on two different levels. On the one hand, in the case of harm actually caused to persons and to individuals, the response cannot, prima facie, be general in nature; instead, the responses must be tailored to the individuals, on a case-by-case basis. If it is established that a deprivation of liberty is not authorized by law, i.e., that the deprivation of liberty is unlawful, then a standard would have to be established for determining reparations. That standard must consider what had been and what might have been each individual’s life plan had the State not unlawfully and improperly stepped in and disrupted it. The settlements must be forward looking as well, so that these cases do not recur. Without belittling the importance of tangible, individual reparations and reparations in the normative area and in institutional policy, symbolic reparations are a necessary tool by which to effect real change for the future and serve a very central instructive purpose for the future of the interpretation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. To begin with, States have to be required to apologize for having enforced, in the case of children, bad laws that were for many years blatantly unconstitutional. States must also pay the necessary pecuniary damages and make reparations in the form of legal and institutional changes. Symbolic reparations are an important dimension not just to work toward a just social policy but also to enhance a State’s own legitimacy. Reform in Paraguay has made headway on the normative or prescriptive front, to bring its laws into line with the Convention on the Rights of the Child. However, it would be a mistake to think that changes at the normative or prescriptive level brought about change in the realm of implementation; normative or prescriptive changes have not always been matched by the institutional reforms needed to put the prescriptive changes into practice. Then, too, imputability is a political and criminal justice decision. There is some debate as to whether imputability in the case of someone under the age of 18 is a