95 sanitary facilities; many did not have beds, blankets and/or mattresses, which forced them to sleep on the floor, take turns with their cellmates or share what few beds and mattresses there were (supra paragraphs 134.9 and 134.10). 166. It has been shown in the instant case (supra para. 134.4) that the overpopulation and crowding were exacerbated by the fact that the inmates were illfed, had few opportunities for exercise or recreation, and were not given prompt and proper medical, dental and psychological care (supra paragraphs 134.6 and 134.7). 167. Among the methods of punishment used at the Center were solitary confinement, torture and detention incommunicado, as a means to impose discipline over the inmate population (supra para. 134.16). These methods of discipline are strictly prohibited by the American Convention.170 And while it has not been shown that all inmates at the Center experienced solitary confinement, torture, or detention incommunicado, the mere threat of conduct prohibited by Article 5 of the American Convention, when sufficiently real and imminent, can itself be in conflict with that article. In other words, creating a threatening situation or threatening an individual with torture may, in some circumstances, constitute inhumane treatment.171 In the case sub judice, the threat of those punishments was real, creating a climate of relentless tension and violence that was inimical to the inmates’ right to live with dignity. 168. Similarly, the subhuman and degrading detention conditions that all the inmates at the Center were forced to endure inevitably affected their mental health, with adverse consequences for the psychological growth and development of their lives and mental health. 169. It has also been established that the inmates at the Center who had been charged but never convicted were not held in quarters separate from convicted inmates. All inmates were subjected to the same treatment, and no distinction was made for whether they were convicted or not (supra paragraphs 134.20 and 134.21). This created a climate of insecurity, tension and violence in the Center. The State itself has admitted that the accused and the convicted were not housed separately and has attributed the situation to “a lack of means.”172 Finally, inmates were not given effective opportunities to reform and find their place in mainstream society (supra para. 134.24). 170. The Court can therefore conclude that conditions at the Center were never of the kind that would have enabled those deprived of their liberty to live with dignity; instead, the inmates were forced to live permanently in inhuman and degrading conditions, exposed to an atmosphere of violence, danger, abuse, corruption, mistrust and promiscuity, where the rule that prevailed was survival of the fittest, with all its consequences. Indeed, in his ruling on the petition of generic habeas corpus filed on behalf of the inmates at the Center, the Civil and Commercial Law Judge of First Instance, Ninth Rotation (supra para. 134.28) found that “the 170 Cf. Case of Maritza Urrutia, supra note 57, para. 87; Case of Hilaire, supra note 153, para. 164; and Case of Bámaca Velásquez. Judgment of November 25, 2000. Series C No. 70, para. 150. 171 Cf. Case of the 19 Tradesmen, supra note 26, para. 149; and Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.), supra note 152, para. 165. See also the European Court of Human Rights, Campbell and Cosans, judgment of 25 February 1982, Series A, no. 48, p. 12, § 26. 172 Brief answering the application, para. 201, p. 55.