annulment […] must be analyzed in that context and […] in accordance with Article 46(2)(c) [because] there [was] a delay in issuing the respective decision, and […] the lapse of more than three years in deciding this appeal is a factor that falls within the framework of the exception to the exhaustion of domestic remedies due to an unwarranted delay.” 151 129. Subsequently, in its final written observations before the Court, the Inter-American Commission took “note of the distinction between the different types of nullity under the Venezuelan Code of Criminal Procedure” and that “the nullity presented by Mr. Brewer Carías was not a request for annulment of the charges, but of all the previous proceedings and based on reasons of fundamental rights,” with the consequence that “the requests for annulment at the intermediate stage – such as in this specific case – can be decided either before the preliminary hearing or after it, depending on their nature.” Thus, the Commission considered that “pursuant to Venezuela’s domestic law, it was not obligatory to await the preliminary hearing in order to decide the request for annulment.” 130. Taking the foregoing into consideration, the Court notes that there are two interpretations of the procedural stage at which the requests for annulment that have been submitted should be decided. Despite this, there are elements related to the content of the appeal that allow the following considerations to be made. 131. First, the Court notes that the judgments provided by the representatives in support of their arguments refer to specific requests concerning particular procedural actions that differ from the brief requesting the annulment of all the proceedings presented by the defense of Mr. Brewer Carías. In fact, they are judgments that refer to specific requests relating to particular procedural actions that did not involve the annulment of all previous the proceedings. 152 This type of request can be decided within the three days indicated in article 177 of the OCCP, contrary to an appeal of 523 pages, 90 of which focus on requesting the annulment of all the proceedings up until that date. 132. In addition, the Court takes into account that the Supreme Court of Justice has established that the procedural stage for deciding briefs that request annulments depends on when they were filed and on the type of arguments they include. Specifically, the Supreme Court has indicated that, if the request for annulment coincides with the preliminary questions, this request must be decided together with the preliminary questions during the preliminary hearing (supra para. 124). The Court stresses that the 523-page brief included arguments concerning, among other matters, the non-liability of the lawyer in the exercise of his profession, and gave details of disputes that are not only procedural, but involve substantive aspects concerning the merits and criminal liability, as well as requests 151 Admissibility report No. 97/09, Petition 84-07, Allan R. Brewer Carías, Venezuela, September 8, 2009, para. 89, folio 3629. 152 Indeed, these are judgments where a specific type of absolute nullity must be decided “within a time frame that is ostensibly less than the one established by law in relation to the amparo procedure (judgment No. 100 of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of February 6, 2003: Case of Leonardo Rodríguez Carabalí, Merits Report, tome IV, folio 4581); the presumed omission of a ruling on the request for absolute annulment (judgment of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of May 11, 2011, Merits Report, tome VII); the postponement of decisions on requests by the defense until the preliminary hearing (judgment No. 1198 of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of February 6, 2003: Case of Luis Enrique Guevara Medina, Merits Report, tome IV, folio 4582); the appeal for review of a preventive measure of deprivation of liberty (judgment of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of July 22, 2004, Merits Report, tome VII, folios 3251 to 3257); irregularities in the substitution of defense counsel by a public defender appointed by a judge (judgment No. 2161 of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of September 5, 2002, Merits Report, tome IV, folio 4583), and the inadmissibility of a joint application for constitutional amparo and for a declaration of nullity (judgment No. 349 of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of February 26, 2002, Merits Report, tome IV, folio 4583). 42