the Court and accepted by him, in consultation with the other judges, in accordance with the statutory and regulatory provisions that regulate this matter” and considered “inadmissible the State’s arguments concerning the alleged failure to provide grounds for the reason given by Judge Vio Grossi to recuse himself, as well as those relating to the State’s ‘rejection’ of the said excuse claiming that Judge Eduardo Vio Grossi was obliged to hear the case.” Consequently, the objections presented by the State in this regard have already been decided. B. The preliminary objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies B.1. Arguments of the State, the Commission, and the representative 17. The State argued that “the supposed victim has not filed and exhausted the remedies established in domestic law, before resorting to the inter-American system” and that “the petitioners did not exercise and exhaust the remedies established in Venezuelan law in order to assert their claims and obtain the judicial protection of the rights they considered had been violated.” In this regard, it argued the existence of “the remedies corresponding to the intermediate stage established in the Organic Code of Criminal Procedure; also, the exhaustion of the trial stage, if applicable, as well as [the existence of] effective remedies, [such as] the appeals against decisions, against final judgments, for reconsideration, for cassation, [and] for review.” As possible remedies, the State indicated the remedies mentioned in article 328 of the Organic Code of Criminal Procedure in force (hereinafter “OCCP”), the remedy of appeal (article 453 of the OCCP), the remedy of cassation (article 459 of the OCCP), and the appeal for review (article 470 of the OCCP). It added that “[t]he effectiveness of these remedies would, if applicable, achieve the results desired by the petitioners”; moreover “the Venezuelan system of justice includes appropriate mechanisms consonant with the right of defense.” 18. The State also argued that “there is no human rights violation in a trial that never started because the petitioner left the country.” Regarding the preliminary hearing, the State argued that “the absence of Mr. Brewer Carías has made it impossible to hold the preliminary hearing, [which] has prevented the exercise of the actions established in the Organic Code of Criminal Procedure that enable the parties to the proceedings to assert their rights.” The State argued that “[i]t should be repeated that it is essential to hold the preliminary hearing so that the criminal proceedings may continue; moreover, the case may be decided in his favor.” It indicated that this “is the opportunity granted to the accused to deny, contest, and argue the facts and the law, to reply, make a rejoinder or a rebuttal, and speak with defense counsel at all times without this entailing the suspension of the hearing.” In addition, it considered it “unusual to claim that the judge can decide the request for a declaration of nullity without the presence of the accused, and that the preliminary hearing can be held subsequently, [because] this would result in a major violation of due process and of the rights of Mr. Brewer Carías.” 19. Consequently, it argued that the request for annulment filed by the representatives of Mr. Brewer Carías is “the response to the charges, and the requests made in it are the logical consequence of the arguments put forward by the defense counsel and not the recusal presented by Judge Vio Grossi.” On November 29, 2012, the Court in plenary decided to confirm that Judge Eduardo Vio Grossi’s recusal from hearing the case of Brewer Carías v. Venezuela had been presented to the President of the Court at the time and accepted by him, in consultation with the other judges, pursuant to the statutory and regulatory provisions that regulate this matter. See, in this respect: Case of Brewer Carías v. Venezuela. Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of November 29, 2012. Available at: http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/asuntos/brewer_29_11_12.pdf 8