4 AMC Superior Prosecutor, which was to issue a new closing statement regarding all the accused in the case. 14. The petitioner contends that the closing statement was issued on September 21, 2006, in which the Public Prosecutor requested that all charges against the accused be dropped; the Preliminary Proceedings Court so ordered on June 4, 2010. The petitioner states that she appealed that decision, which the higher court vacated on November 22, 2010. However, she reports that as of June 2011, the hearing at which a new Preliminary Proceedings Court would rule on the request for dismissal of the charges was still pending. 7 15. The petitioner alleges that the various appeals and motions she filed throughout the criminal case were decided belatedly and in the end proved to be ineffective mechanisms for remedying the “acts of negligence” committed and for getting the officers of the court to meet the deadlines and carry out the procedural phases that the law prescribes. She observes that she did more than just appeal the court rulings; faced with the looming threat that justice would be denied, and to avoid criminal action being time barred, on June 19, 2001 she also filed a petition seeking constitutional amparo which she alleges was not promptly examined by the competent judicial authority. She contends that on July 9, 2001, she filed a supervening petition seeking constitutional amparo with the Administrative Law Superior Court of the Lara State Judicial Circuit, “requesting that the petition of amparo not be allowed to languish and that it be referred directly to the competent judge.” 8 16. She points out that in a decision of May 28, 2003, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court declared her petition of amparo inadmissible. She maintains that although this decision determined that the effect of the actions taken by the petitioner was to toll the statute of limitations for criminal prosecution, under Article 110 of the Venezuelan Penal Code, when the process goes on for a period of time equal to the applicable statute of limitations –which in this case was three years- plus half that period, and cannot be blamed on the accused, then the statute of limitations on criminal prosecution expires. She states that the statute of limitations for criminal prosecution of this crime had expired on August 13, 2006, so that prosecution of the crime was time barred. Hence, any court ruling would “necessarily and for the sake of legal certainty” so rule, which would mean that there would be no way to “get justice” from the domestic courts. 17. The petitioner therefore alleges that since any possibility of prosecuting those responsible for the injuries caused to Mrs Balbina Rodríguez was now precluded, she also lost any possibility of filing a civil suit for damages and injuries since, under Venezuelan law, in order to establish a respondent’s civil liability that respondent must first be found guilty in criminal court. 18. Similarly, the petitioner argues that under the COPP, in cases of this kind the time that the Public Prosecutor has to issue its closing statement wrapping up the preliminary phase is “discretionary”, so she would have had no suitable mechanism to get the Prosecutor’s Office to comply with its exclusive legal mandate for prosecuting crime. The petitioner argues that the Code of Criminal Prosecution provided that “in any case that can be brought ex officio, any private party –aggrieved or not- can become a plaintiff before any court with jurisdiction to conduct the respective preliminary criminal investigation.” She contends that the COPP’s entry into force was prejudicial to the alleged victim, as it “denied” her the opportunity to bring a criminal case and move it forward 7 By a communication received on June 15, 2011, the petitioner reported that by that point in time, the hearing had been postponed eleven times; the most recent date set for the hearing was June 22, 2011. 8 She states that the Court declined jurisdiction in the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court which, in a ruling delivered on January 6, 2002, decided that, as a precautionary measure, the expiration of the statute of limitations would be deferred until such time as the original petition of amparo was decided.