3 human rights treaties.2 I. Regarding the obligation to nullify the criminal sentence imposed on Mr. Kimel and all the effects thereof (operative paragraph seven of the Judgment). 7. The State reported that it had consulted different State entities about “the possibility that the State [would] promote the adoption of a ruling that [would] declare the illegality of the sentence imposed on Mr. Kimel.” It indicated that the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation had manifested that, “the aspects related to the operative paragraph in question ‘…must [be] processed in the respective judicial proceedings following our legal system’s most suitable proceedings…’” In light of this recommendation, the Board of Legal Matters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a ruling on the legal viability of the State filing an application for review of the judgment imposed on Mr. Kimel, by which it explained that “it may file an application for review through the retrospective application of a criminal law more benign than that applied in the judgment.” Also, in said ruling, the State manifested that “the persons able to [exercise said recourse would be:] 1) the convicted and/or his defense, if he were unable, his legal representatives, or, if he had died, his spouse, his ancestors, descendants or siblings[, and] 2) the Public Prosecutor.” Following this ruling, on February 5, 2010, the administrative proceedings were sent to the Attorney General’s Office of the Nation “for the purposes of considering the possibility that the Public Prosecutor’s Office [would] present the corresponding application for review.” On April 13, 2010, the Attorney General’s Office indicated that “it deem[ed] that [said] petition [would] not be an issue that concerns [the] Attorney General given that slander is privately actionable [, and that a]ccording to [the] criminal system and criminal proceedings [of Argentina], the Public Prosecutor’s Office [would] not be procedurally competent for such crimes and therefore, [would] not have the power to file a application for review for a condemnatory judgment.” According to the Attorney General’s Office, the following persons are qualified to file such an application for review, “the convicted, and if he had died, his spouse, his ancestors, descendants or siblings.” In virtue of the conclusions of these bodies, Argentina manifested that “the State lacks the procedural legitimacy to file an application for review in the present case.” Nevertheless, the State manifested “its determination to send […] an amicus curiae to the respective court in the eventuality that the petitioners decide to file the aforementioned application for review.” 8. The representatives manifested their concern for, and rejection of, “the stance adopted by certain Argentine state-run agencies that maintain that it is the victim himself – or, in this case, his next of kin- that must make new legal and procedural efforts so that the State can comply with this point of the [J]udgment of the Court.” They consider that the State “has not made sufficient efforts to comply, in a comprehensive and holistic manner, with the [J]udgment.” They that, in light of an international duty, “reasons related to the limitations of domestic law do not justify the non-compliance;” therefore, the different State agencies must adapt their practices so as to effectively comply with the measures set forth by the Inter-American Court, including encouraging any necessary legal amendments. They expressed their concern regarding the State’s inability to nullify a civil or criminal sentence when ordered to do so by an international human rights body; however, they insist that this does not constitute an excuse to cease implementing the decisions. Accordingly, they referred to the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation of Argentina, according to which “the lack of guarantees or mechanisms to uphold these rights must addressed by the Judicial Power that acts as the final guarantor of [such] rights.” They 2 Cf. Case of Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru. Competence. Judgment of September 24, 1999, Series C No. 54, paragraph 37; Order of the Court of September 1 2010, Considering sixth and Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panama, supra note 1, Considering Clause six.