4 stated that the solution proposed by the State “implies imposing on the victim, once again, the burden of ensuring compliance with a judgment, in their favor, after years of litigation before both national and international courts.” Notwithstanding the prior considerations, they stated that in the coming days they would file the respective application for review, “so as to speed up full compliance with the [J]udgment.” To this end, they expressed that “they [undertook] the [State’s] commitment to either act as amicus curiae or interested third party in the case” after filing the application, and they would also inform the Court of the stance held by those judicial authorities that must take part in the case. They added that the State “[must], at least, bear the costs and expenses that this work entail[ed],” manifesting that they hoped the Court would set an amount “as it has been doing in recent judgments, making evidentiary standards flexible and executed [in] an fair manner.” 8. The Commission stated that “as a general rule, it is not acceptable that the State cites domestic legal obstacles as a reason to not comply with their international obligations,” which include the orders issued by the Inter-American Court. Nevertheless, the Commission observed that given, inter alia, the representatives stated that they would file an application for review and that the State manifested that it would support said filing as an amicus curiae, they were following the development of the proceeding and hoped that it would be processed promptly so that that the Tribunal could acknowledge compliance with all the reparation measures ordered in the present case. Also, the Commission considered that Argentina must pay the expenses incurred by the representatives throughout the judicial proceedings. 9. The Court reminds that in paragraph 123 of the Judgment it ordered that the State must, within six months of its notification, “nullify [the condemnatory judgment imposed on Mr. Kimel that constituted a violation of his right to the freedom of expression], in every aspect, including the implications that it [would] have upon third parties, namely: 1) labeling Mr. Kimel as the author of slander; 2) imposing a one year suspended prison sentence, and 3) the order to pay $20,000 (twenty thousand Argentine pesos).” 11. The Tribunal values the willingness shown by the representatives to file an application for review in order to advance towards compliance with the aforementioned reparation, given that the State would not do so on in its own accord. Nevertheless, the Court deems it appropriate to remind that the duty established in operative paragraph seven of the Judgment is an obligation of the State, and it cannot ignore its pre-established international responsibility based on domestic order grounds.3 Accordingly, the Tribunal notes that in other cases in which this Court also ordered, as a reparation measure, to nullify the criminal conviction imposed on a victim for slander, in violation of his rights, the State proceeded on its own accord to comply with the reparation ordered, but rather the intervention of the victim or his next of kin is also necessary.4 Accordingly, the Court notes that the present obligation is not fulfilled by the mere intervention of the State as an amicus curiae in the appropriate proceedings, but it requires that the corresponding State authorities nullify the criminal sentence imposed against Mr. Kimel, as well as all the effects thereof, as set forth in the Judgment. Likewise, the Court reminds that the treaty 3 Cf. International Responsibility for the Promulgation and Enforcement of Laws in Violation of the Convention (Arts. 1 and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-14/94 of December 9, 1994. Series A No. 14, par. 35; Cae of De la Cruz Flores v. Perú, supra note 2, Considering fifth, and Case Tristán Donoso v. Panama, supra note 1, Considering Clause five. 4 Cf. Case of Tristán Donoso V. Panama, supra note 1, Considering Clause twelve to nineteen.