framework in effect at the time of the facts, and it was only when evidence or indications of extrajudicial executions came to light that the ordinary courts immediately took over the investigations. The State contended that, despite any potential objections about its work, military justice had safeguarded the documentation that would later become part of the body of evidence in the investigation that began in 2001 and the resulting criminal trial. 395. The State also held that “when the Supreme Court concluded in 2013 that Víctor Salomón Peceros Pedraza and Herma Luz Meléndez Cruz had died in combat, it was upholding the same conclusion reached by military justice.” It added that “even if it is argued that the hearing of this case by the military jurisdiction constituted a breach of procedural guarantees protected by the [American Convention], these guarantees were in fact respected in the process before the Supreme Court, which drew the same conclusion.” The State noted that the ruling by the Third Special Criminal Chamber did reflect disagreement among the judges about the death of Eduardo Cruz Sánchez. The State held, in this regard, that “the continuing questions about the scope of the ruling by the military courts can be debated in the domestic sphere,” depending on the position taken by the public prosecutor on whether to open an investigation into the death of Cruz Sánchez. Considerations of the Court 396. The Court must first clarify, regarding the alleged victims in this case, that the military jurisdiction heard only the alleged extrajudicial executions of Herma Luz Meléndez Cueva and Víctor Salomón Peceros Pedraza, but not that of Eduardo Nicolás Cruz Sánchez (supra para. 185). 397. The Court would recall that its case law on the limited sphere of military courts to hear cases of human rights violations has consistently held that in a democratic state under the rule of law, the jurisdiction of military criminal courts must be restrictive and exceptional, applied only to the protection of legal interests associated with the particular functions of the armed forces.445 This is why the Court has held that the military courts must judge only active-duty military personnel for committing crimes or misdemeanors that by their very nature affect the particular legally protected interests intrinsic to the military system. 446 398. Moreover, considering the nature of the crime and the legally protected interest that has been injured, the military criminal courts have no competent jurisdiction to investigate and, if necessary, prosecute and punish the perpetrators of human rights violations; instead, the prosecution of such cases must always fall to the general justice system.447 In this sense, the Court has held that “when military justice assumes competence for a matter that should be heard by ordinary justice, the right to an ordinary judge and, a fortiori, to due process is harmed,448 and this, in turn, is closely related to the right of access to justice. The presiding Cf. Case of Durand and Ugarte v. Peru. Merits, supra, para. 117, and Case of Argüelles et al. v. Argentina, supra, para. 148. 445 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 30, 1999. Series C No. 52, para. 128, and Case of Argüelles et al. v. Argentina, supra, para. 148. 446 Cf. Case of the Rochela Massacre v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 11, 2007. Series C No. 163, para. 200, and Case of Argüelles et al. v. Argentina, supra, para. 148. 447 Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs, supra, para. 128, and Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 26, 2010. Series C No. 220, para. 197. 448