91. The case law of the Commission and the Inter-American Court has indicated that limits on freedom of expression must be exceptional in nature, and to be admissible, they must meet the three basic conditions established in Article 13(2) of the Convention: (a) the limit should be defined precisely and clearly in a law with full force and effect. The IACHR has indicated that, “vague or ambiguous legal provisions that grant, through this channel, very broad discretionary powers to the authorities are incompatible with the American Convention because they can support potentially arbitrary acts that are tantamount to prior censorship or that establish disproportionate liabilities for the expression of protected speech.”63 Also, for subsequent liability that restricts freedom of expression to be legitimate, it is not enough for it to simply be established clearly and precisely in a law. It also must be determined b) if the objective it pursues is legitimate and justified by the American Convention, and c) is necessary in a democratic society to accomplish its goals, strictly proportional, and appropriate to accomplish the compelling goals it seeks.64 92. The Commission observes that in this case, the alleged victim received a disciplinary sanction as a consequences of his expression in the paper he submitted to the Supreme Court of Justice titled “Public Policy Proposal for Introducing a Human Rights Focus to the Work of the Judicial Branch of the Republic of Chile”—specifically, his proposal that the Judicial Branch recognize its responsibility in the human rights violations that took place during the military regime and pursue a “moral repositioning.” The first ruling imposed a sanction of “written censure,” which on appeal was changed to the sanction of “private admonishment.” 93. Based on this, the IACHR observes that the alleged victim was subjected to subsequent liability for the exercise of his freedom of expression. It will therefore be determined if the restrictions met the requirements stipulated in Article 13(2) of the American Convention. 94. Regarding the requirement of legality, the IACHR recalls that in the previous section, it already determined that the disciplinary grounds applied in the case of the alleged victim did not comply with the principle of legality, for which reason the sanction in this case does not even pass the first part of the tripartite test. This in itself is sufficient to declare that Mr. Urrutia Laubreaux’s right to freedom of expression was violated. Without prejudice to this, the IACHR considers it appropriate to present some general considerations regarding the other elements of the test. 95. As regards the legitimate goal of the restriction, the IACHR highlights that according to the rationale of the La Serena Appellate Court and the Supreme Court of Justice, the objective of the restriction was to ensure respect for ranking superiors, or as they put it, “the principle of the chain of command that governs the legal structure of the Judicial Branch.” The Commission considers that the goal of ensuring respect for the “chain of command” cannot be understood within the goals that Article 13(2) of the American Convention establishes as legitimate to justify the imposition of subsequent liability restrictions, those goals being: (i) respect for the rights or reputation of others; or (ii) to protect national security, public order, or public health or morals. 96. At the same time, the IACHR observes that there is also no means-to-an-end relationship between restricting production of an academic paper and the end sought. Thus, the requirement that the measure be necessary in a democratic society is also not met. The Commission underscores that the academic paper was not made public and contained a criticism of the stance taken by the Judicial Branch during the military regime in order to introduce a human rights focus in the Judicial Branch. It also included a series of proposals for the Judicial Branch to “morally reposition” it and prevent repetition of human rights violations. The Commission finds that the opinions and expressions contained in the academic paper are in the public interest, and therefore, they must be more rigorously protected, as they contribute to the public debate on how the Judicial Branch can respond to allegations of grave human rights violations.65 63 IACHR, 2009 Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. 51, December 30, 2009, chap. III, para. 71. 64 IACHR, Report No. 103/13, Case 12,816, Merits Report, Adán Guillermo López Lone et al., Honduras, para. 207. 65 Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, IACHR, Inter-American Framework on the Right to Freedom of Expression, OEA/Ser.L/V/II CIDH/RELE/INF.2/09, December 30, 2009, para. 35. 16