person under the domestic administrative proceedings for loss of potential earnings. Should the compensation ordered in those domestic proceedings exceed the compensation ordered by the Court in this judgment, the State many not require the victims to return the difference. 5 7. The decision of the majority of the members of the Court with which I dissent also implies a departure from one of the most fundamental aspects of its case law, established in the first judgment on reparations, in the Velásquez Rodríguez case: 6 28. Indemnification for human rights violations is supported by international instruments of a universal and regional character. Based on the Optional Protocol, the Human Rights Committee, created by the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights of the United Nations, has repeatedly called for compensation for violation of human rights recognized in the Covenant (see, for example, communications 4/1977; 6/1977; 11/1977; 132/1982; 138/1983; 147/1983; 161/1983; 188/1984; 194/1985; etc., Reports of the Human Rights Committee, United Nations). The European Court of Human Rights has reached the same conclusion, based upon Article 50 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 29. Article 63(1) of the American Convention provides as follows: If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party. 30. This article does not refer to or limit the ability to ensure the effectiveness of the means of reparation available under the internal law of the State Party responsible for the violation, so it is not limited by the defects, imperfections or deficiencies of national law, but functions independently of it. 31. This implies that, in order to establish the corresponding indemnity, the Court must rely upon the American Convention and the applicable principles of international law. 8. It is undeniable that, regarding “the formula used to calculate and distribute the compensation for loss of earnings” (Case of the La Rochela Massacre, para. 246), there is an evident difference between the criteria used by the Colombian State, which consists in considering only “the amount of money those who were financially dependent on the victim failed to perceive from him” (para. 245 of the judgment), and the criteria of the Court, which “considers that the compensation for loss of earnings should include the income that the deceased victim would have received during his or her remaining life expectancy” and that this “amount, therefore, is incorporated into the estate of the deceased victim, but is delivered to the next of kin”; therefore, “the Court will determine the appropriate amounts that it deems pertinent to order” (Case of the La Rochela Massacre, para. 246). 9. Furthermore, I consider that the reasoning of the majority of the members of the Court is incorrect when it progresses from the premise that “when national mechanisms exist to determine forms of reparation” they “can be assessed,” to affirming that “it has 5 [Footnote 245 in the text of the judgment in the Case of the La Rochela Massacre] Cf. Case of the Ituango Massacres, supra note 15, para. 376. 6 31. Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Reparations and costs. Judgment of July 21, 1989. Series C No. 7, paras. 28 to 3