33. In addition, they allege that the requests for arrest warrants sent to INTERPOL are manifestly inadequate and abusive given that the crime of which Allan Brewer Carías is charged is a typical pure political crime, and Article 3 of the INTERPOL Constitution prohibits it from engaging in “any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character.” They consider that the determination by the domestic courts that the conduct imputed to Brewer Carías constitutes a common crime is “... an arbitrary maneuver that changes the legal characterization of the crime imputed, constitutes violations of due process, and may entail ill-fated consequences for his liberty, security, and honor.” They argue that such arrest warrants violate the principle of the presumption of innocence. 34. In addition, they argue that entities such as the National Assembly, the Supreme Court of Justice, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, as well as members of the diplomatic corps made public statements on the scope of the conduct of which Brewer Carías is accused and his alleged guilt. 35. As for the National Assembly, they allege that in the report of the “Special Parliamentary Commission to investigate the events of April 2002” it has been shown that Allan Brewer Carías participated in conduct from which he was afforded no opportunity to defend himself. They also allege that said report violates the principle of legality. They indicate that 40% of the members of the Assembly voted against the report on the grounds that “it invents a new category of sanction … to try to establish moral or ethical liabilities in respect of citizens who hold no position as a public servant.”28 36. In the case of the Supreme Court of Justice, they allege that it had anticipated an opinion on indicating in writing that “in numerous witness testimony that is publicly known, Mr. Allan Brewer-Carías is indicated as one of the authors of the decree in question, and of these there is one that stands out, which is the narration of the events by none other than Pedro Carmona Estanga in his book ‘Mi testimonio ante la Historia.’”29 They allege that the Attorney General of the Republic also gave an anticipated opinion on Allan Brewer Carías’ guilt in his book “Abril Comienza en Octubre,”30 in which he assumes as true certain assertions made in the media that were under investigation by his office, and which were never ratified with testimony or corroborated. They indicate that Allan Brewer Carías took the matter up with the Attorney General of the Republic in a missive sent on the eve of his departure from Venezuela.31 Finally, the members of the diplomatic corps publicly referred to Allan Brewer Carías as a “conspirator” and “author of the April 12 Decree,” conduct imputed to him without evidence or any judicial finding of guilt. 37. With respect to the right of the accused to have adequate time and means for the preparation of his defense, established at Article 8(2)(c) of the American Convention, the petitioners allege that during the investigative stage Allan Brewer Carías’s defense counsel were unable to obtain a copy of any part of the record, rather, they were only allowed to transcribe manually the various documents in the record, causing the defense irreparable harm. 38. With respect to the right of the defense to question the witnesses and to call witnesses or expert witnesses to cast light on the facts, established in Article 8(2)(f) of the American Convention, the petitioners allege that Allan Brewer Carías’s defense was not allowed to be present during the testimony of the witnesses called to testify by the Sixth Prosecutor. They They indicate that the legislators considered that the investigation of these citizens violates the principle of legality on seeking to establish political liabilities and sanction them without them being public employees “… (in flagrant contradiction with other political responsibilities that it does establish for other citizens who don’t hold any public office either). But in this case one fabricates a non-existent sanction … which constitutes a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused and in open violation as well of the general principle of law according to which nulla crimen sine lege.” Original petition received January 24, 2007, para. 76. 29 Letters of December 13, 2005 and January 31, 2006 from the Supreme Court of Justice to the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights and to the Ibero-American Institute of Procedural Law (Instituto Iberoamericano de Derecho Procesal). Original petition received January 24, 2007, para. 78. 30 Isaías Rodríguez, “Abril comienza en octubre,” Caracas, September 2005, Annex 21 to the original petition received January 24, 2007, para. 80. 31 Letter from Allan Brewer Carías, in: Allan Brewer Carías, En mi propia defensa, Editorial Jurídica Venezolana, Caracas, 2006, Annex 2 to the original petition received January 24, 2007, para. 80. 28 8