7 associated personnel; or require measures necessary to prevent that acts of State’s agents or private individuals hinder the seeking, reception and dissemination of information or guarantee the exercise of the right to freedom of expression and thought, particularly, the exercise of the profession of the petitioners. The majority has an opinion different to what I put forward herein as has been read from the operative paragraphs of the judgment and paragraph 300 thereof. These claims, as we saw, are protected by other remedies that were not exhausted. The foregoing shows sufficient reasons to dissent from the majority opinion. 1.2 On the procedural moment to raise the objection One of the reasons given by the majority of the judges to dismiss the objection of nonexhaustion of domestic remedies was that the State failed to point out the remedies that remained to be exhausted by the alleged victims and that it did not allege either, the lack of exhaustion of such remedies 11, coming to the conclusion, in this way, that said preliminary objection was not raised but until the adoption of the Report on Admissibility by the Commission by means of a brief submitted during the stage of merits, substantiated before the Commission; therefore, the majority of the judges concluded that the State did not raise this objection at the appropriate procedural moment. It is impossible to agree either on the procedural moment to raise the objection, though it seems this is an alternative criteria established in previous decisions12, inasmuch as that would mean to accept that an State’s agent may change, before the Commission or the Court, the terms under which the State (whichever state it is) accepted to become a member state to the American Convention on Human Rights. We understand that if the goal was to establish a preclusive opportunity to raise this objection, the text of the American Convention should expressly establish so. Nothing of the foregoing means that the purpose of the decision of the majority opinion regarding the preclusion effect of the terms was not understood, but that such terms should be expressly established. 11 The other reason given by the Court to dismiss the preliminary objection is based on the Court's assessment regarding the other allegations put forward by the State and the representatives and the fact that they are closely tied to the merits of the case and shall, therefore, be considered, where pertinent, in the corresponding chapters ... 12 Cases: A) Respondent State may expressly or impliedly waive the right to invoke this rule (Case of Castillo Páez, Preliminary Objections. Judgment of January 30, 1996. Series C No. 24, para. 40; Case of Loayza Tamayo; Preliminary Objections. Judgment of January 31, 1996. Series C No. 25, para. 40). B) the objection asserting non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, to be timely, must be made at an early stage of the proceedings or as has been established in subsequent judgments, the objection, to be timely, must be raised at the stage of admissibility of the case before the Commission, that is, before any consideration as to the merits; otherwise, the express waive of the right to invoke it shall be presumed by the party having the right to it (Case of Castillo Páez, Preliminary Objections. Ibid. page. 40; Case of Loayza Tamayo; Preliminary Objections. Ibid., para. 40; Case of Loayza Tamayo; Preliminary Objections. Judgment of September 4, 1998. Series C No. 41, para. 56). Case of Kimel, supra note 26, para. 49; Case of Herrera Ulloa, supra note 27, para. 81; Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community. Preliminary Objections, supra note 29, para. 53. c) the State claiming nonexhaustion has an obligation to prove that domestic remedies remain to be exhausted and that they are effective (Case of Castillo Paéz, Preliminary Objections. Ibid. para. 40; Case of Loayza Tamayo; Preliminary Objections. Ibid., para. 40; Case of Cantoral Benavidez; Preliminary Objections. Judgment of September 3, 1998. Series C No. 40, para. 31; Case of Durand and Ugarte, Preliminary Objections. Judgment of May 28, 1999. Series C No. 50, para. 33). This criterion has been recently ratified in the following matters: Case of the Saramaka People V. Surinam. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Legal Costs. Judgment of November 28, 2007. Series C No. 172, para. 43 and Case of Salvador Chiriboga V. Ecuador. Preliminary Objection and Merits. Judgment of May 6, 2008. Series C No. 179, para. 40.