14 In light of the foregoing, it would seem evident the unremarkably efficiency and effectiveness of the Venezuelan judicial system and as a result, it would seem appropriate the decision contained in the judgment regarding the non-compliance with the duty to guarantee the rights enshrined in articles 13.1 and 5.1 of the Convention, considering such ineffectiveness. Nevertheless, as shall be analyzed infra, that must not have been a determining factor in the decision. d) When discussing, in this subchapter, the violation of the mental and moral integrity of the alleged victims, even when the Court disregards the expert examination represented by the psychological evaluation made by Magdalena López, it determines – presumably, based on the experience inasmuch as there is no evidence that would allow to scientifically come to the conclusion of the sentencing majority- that, by virtue of the fact that the alleged victims were subjected to hindrances, aggressions, threats, acts of harassment and intimidation during their jobs, the State is responsible of the obligation to guarantee the right to mental and moral integrity of the victims mentioned. (Paragraph 287). I presume that this decision was made because the State exposed the alleged victims to a situation of relative vulnerability as well as due to the lack of effectiveness of the system and the Venezuelan judiciary. Considering that there is no reasoning for the conclusion that the sentencing majority came to, we must ratify that the causal link is very weak or nonexistent as has been analyzed supra. Lastly and following the order mentioned, I note in the third subchapter that: a) The Court, after analyzing the arguments of the State where it was mentioned other actions instituted different from the criminal ones (paragraph 301), concludes that the parties have emphasized the complaints and investigations conducted by the criminal courts, ending with an analysis of the existing remedies available at the criminal courts (paragraph 305). I ratify the statement made supra regarding the fact there was no consistency between the claims lodged before the Inter-American system for protection and the domestic remedies that should be exhausted in order to have access to that system, insofar as a criminal court, acting with criminal jurisdiction in Venezuela, shall not be able to restore the situation alleged by the victims to be impaired. These actions may be verified by means of administrative actions or remedies stipulated in the Venezuelan set of rules or constitutional measures. b) By considering that the criminal proceedings were not suitable or sufficient, as has been pointed out supra, the Court only analyzed the efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal proceedings to prove – mistakenly, in my opinion- that if the State’s organs acted according to the terms of the COPP (Basic Code of Criminal Procedure)22 the results of this case would be different. c) The judgment even analysis the lack of action on the part of the State during the criminal proceedings to conclude that such inactivity led to a detrimental act for the victims. In fact, it was mentioned that the Attorney General’s Office had to request the dismissal of the complaints in case that after the opening of the investigation, it was determined that the facts of this case constituted a crime that needed to be prosecuted at the request of a party, in accordance with section 301 of the COPP of 2001. It is necessary to emphasize that two sections of that instrument are in conflict with this decision: sections 24 and 2523 . To base the decision to condemn the State 24 on the 22 See para.310 to 312 of the judgment from which I dissent.