15 contends that the questioning of witnesses conducted by the prosecutor is not the equivalent of testimony given in court during the trial stage, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 355 and 356 of the COPP. Once the identity of a person called to testify by the prosecutor’s office is known, the defense may request that the Public Ministry ask the witness certain questions, providing it demonstrates the 18 relevance, need, usefulness, and connection thereof to the investigation. Venezuela points out that in Brewer Carías’s case, the defense did not ask the Public Ministry to do so. The defense must show the relevance, need, usefulness, and connection to the investigation of the persons it suggests the prosecutor should interview during the investigation phase, and it may request that certain questions be asked as long as they meet the same requirements. The State contends that Brewer Carías’s attorneys did not meet this requirement. It points out that during interviews at the prosecutor’s office, the defense may actively participate in that investigation (which is not a proceeding to enter evidence for trial) and that will be reflected in the record of the interview. The State also points out that if the results of such investigations are admitted by the Court of Control and then progress on to the Trial Court, it is at that point that the defense may question and cross-examine witnesses and can control the process of witness examination. Venezuela stresses that the present case has not reached the trial phase and, therefore, the defense will have the opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses whose testimony has been admitted by the Court of Control in the intermediate phase. Thus, the State comes to the conclusion 19 that the petitioners are confusing the investigation phase, the intermediate phase, and the trial phase as provided for in Venezuelan Criminal Procedure. 78. The State contends that Allan Brewer Carías faced the criminal proceedings against him, in liberty, without an arrest warrant issued in his name, until July 14, 2006. The State therefore refutes the petitioners’ contention that “[…] the State tries to deny Dr. Brewer Carías his physical freedom, denies his right to stand trial in liberty, and restricts his freedom of movement by issuing an order for his preventive detention which is not supported by any immediate need and which does not meet minimum national and international legal standards to justify such an exceptional measure.” The State emphasizes that from April 12, 2002, until he left the country on June 2, 2006, Allan Brewer Carías enjoyed absolute liberty, and it contends that it was Allan Brewer Carías who provoked the activation of the legal and constitutional mechanisms on which the order of preventive detention was based. 79. With regard to the petitioners’ allegation that international law was violated (see supra III A), the State argues that international human rights law is supplementary and subsidiary and that it does not substitute the State’s own actions. It contends that the petitioners are obliged: (i) to identify the domestic law violated, in this case the COPP and/or the Constitution; (ii) to explain the violation of the domestic law based on its own case file and the jurisprudence and interpretations of the domestic legal system, and without this entailing a presentation of arguments on the merits of the case; and, last, (iii) to translate the domestic law violated into the corresponding international law. 80. The State also points out that by being in contempt of court, Allan Brewer Carías missed the opportunity to be included under the provisions of the Decree with Rank, Value and Force of Special Law of Amnesty issued on December 31, 2007, by President Hugo Chávez Frías, in exercise of his constitutional powers. It notes that the decree in question applied to all persons who: Are at odds with the established order, are within the law and have submitted to criminal proceedings for the following crimes: (A) (B) (C) Drafting the decree of the de facto government of April 12, 2002. Signing the decree of the de facto government of April 12, 2002. The violent take-over of the state government of the State of Mérida on April 12, 2002. 18 The State cites Articles 305, 125.5, and 131 of the COPP. Submission from the Ministry of Popular Power for Foreign Affairs No. AGEV/000394 of August 25, 2009, p. 38. 19 The State indicates that said confusion is also reflected in the petitioners’ citation of Report No. 85/99 of Case No. 11.258 (Figueredo Planchart), which specifically refers to the acts undertaken before a tribunal and not during the investigation.