112. In this regard, the Commission indicated that, on receiving the initial petition, it had identified three groups of facts: (a) those related to the preventive detention of Mr. Díaz Peña and the duration of the proceedings; (b) those related to a series of irregularities in the criminal proceedings, and (c) those related to the detention conditions and the lack of medical attention. According to the Commission, these facts differed in nature and, owing to their continuing nature, it had analyzed the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies separately; consequently, it had declared the first and third groups of facts admissible – namely, the preventive detention, the duration of the proceedings, and the issues of personal integrity – because it considered that Mr. Díaz Peña had exhausted numerous domestic remedies, which it referred to in detail, as well as taking different steps before the domestic authorities. Regarding the facts relating to irregularities concerning due process, the Commission had declared the petition inadmissible precisely because Raúl José Díaz Peña “waived the right to file an appeal against his conviction.” Hence, “since it would have been possible to rectify some of the supposed violations of due process by using this remedy, the Commission considered that the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies had not been met at that time” and, consequently, “the analysis of the merits did not include the arguments on the irregularities in the criminal proceedings; for example, the aspect relating to the illegality of the way evidence was obtained.” Arguments of the representative 113. For her part, the representative endorsed the arguments presented by the Commission and asked that the Court declare the State’s arguments on the preliminary objection inadmissible and continue hearing the case in its entirety. Specifically, the representative stated that, when the petition was lodged before the Commission, the judgment convicting Raúl Díaz Peña had not been delivered and, at that time, it was a question of protecting his rights to presumption of innocence, not to be deprived of liberty unlawfully, to be tried while at liberty, and to due process, especially regarding compliance with a reasonable time, regarding which she argued that the violations “had already been committed and were substantiated as the facts evolved during the proceedings.” The representative stated that Mr. Díaz Peña had exhausted the remedies provided under Venezuelan law for the jurisdictional review of preventive detention, exercising an application for constitutional amparo as a last remedy.221 Regarding the appeal for review established in article 470 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the representative indicated that it was only admissible against final judgments, which did not apply to the presumed victim. In addition, she indicated that the reasons why Raúl Díaz Peña did not exercise the domestic legal remedies when he was sentenced and convicted “related to the constant and systematic failure of the Venezuelan Judiciary to comply with the time frames established in the Code of Criminal Procedure for his trial and for deciding the procedural incidents.” B) Considerations of the Court 114. First, the Court notes that the State, in its arguments, seeks to require the Court to modify its consistent case law which affirms that if the objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies is not filed at the appropriate moment, the possibility of filing this objection is relinquished. In this regard, the Court reiterates, as it has in the cases of Reverón Trujillo, Usón Ramírez and Chocrón 221 On this point, she indicated that Raúl José Díaz Peña technical defense counsel contested the decision that confirmed the judicial measure of preventive detention by filing the appeal for review established in article 264 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, arguing, basically, the expiry of the time limit for preventive detention under the provisions of article 244 of the said Code. To counter the negative decision, an application for constitutional amparo was filed, which was declared inadmissible, and an appeal was filed against this declaration of inadmissibility, which was declared irreceivable by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. 42