163. The Commission asked the Court to establish, in equity, the amount of the reparation corresponding to non-pecuniary damage. 164. The representative requested one million United States dollars for Mr. Díaz Peña for emotional damage, an amount that includes “the pain suffered by Raúl Díaz, owing to six years of political imprisonment in the DISIP cells, which cannot be calculated in money; pain that affects his future life and requires therapies and a lifestyle that can help him overcome the trauma suffered, which is severe,” as well as “the changes in lifestyle (work, physical, emotional, moral and, again, the time away from his immediate family by being obliged to go into exile owing to the harassment that the Venezuelan State has initiated against Raúl Díaz; harassment that continues to this day with continuous statements that try to implicate him in acts of terrorism in Venezuela; constant attacks where he is exposed to public disrepute as a terrorist by President Hugo Chávez, his cabinet and followers, as well as continuous attacks in programs of the Venezuelan State television channel).” Bearing in mind “the circumstance that the recent harassment obliged Raúl Díaz to leave Venezuela and that he is living in [the United States of America],” she asked that the payment be made in the United States of America. 165. In this case it has been proved that Mr. Díaz Peña was subjected to preventive detention in deficient conditions and, consequently, suffered a progressive deterioration of his health because adequate and specialized medical assistance was not provided (supra para. 140). Based on the violations it has declared in this Judgment, the Court considers that it can be presumed that the violations produced non-pecuniary damage, because it is inherent in human nature that any person who suffers a violation of his human rights experiences suffering.267 166. International jurisprudence has established repeatedly that the Judgment may constitute per se a form of reparation.268 However, considering the circumstances of the case sub judice, the Court finds it pertinent to establish an amount, in equity, as compensation for non-pecuniary damage.269 167. Consequently, the Court finds it pertinent to establish, in equity, the sum of US$10,000.00 (ten thousand United States dollars) in favor of Raúl José Díaz Peña, as compensation for nonpecuniary damage. D) Costs and expenses 168. The representative asked that the Venezuelan State be condemned to pay the costs and expenses of these proceedings, without establishing a specific amount for her organization or submitting vouchers for expenditures. 169. The Court reiterates that, under its case law,270 costs and expenses are part of the concept of reparation, because the activity deployed by the victims in order to obtain justice at both the national and the international level entails expenses that must be compensated when the State’s international responsibility is declared in a judgment. 267 Cf. Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, para. 176, and Case of Barbani Duarte et al. v. Uruguay. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 13, 2011. Series C No. 234, para. 259. 268 Cf. Case of El Amparo v. Venezuela. Reparations and costs. Judgment of September 14, 1996. Series C No. 28, para. 35, and Case of Fornerón and daughter v. Argentina, para. 149. 269 Cf. Case of Neira Alegría et al. v. Peru. Reparations and costs. Judgment of September 19, 1996. Series C No. 29, para. 56, and Case of González Medina and family v. Dominican Republic, para. 319. 270 Cf. Case of Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina. Reparations and costs. Judgment of August 27, 1998. Series C No. 39, para. 79, and Case of Fontevecchia and D’Amico v. Argentina. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 29, 2011. Series C No. 238, para. 124. 55