2 8. He stated that up to February 1991, he received the pension to which he was entitled. That month, however, in an internal company communication (No. GA-0130/91), he learned of the suspension of application of Decree Law 20530 to former employees of the company. 9. In view of this situation, the petitioner filed an amparo petition, which was declared to have merit on July 19, 1991, a decision that was upheld by an appeals court on May 29, 1992, and by the Supreme Court of Justice on February 2, 1993. According to the petitioner, in the final judgment, the Supreme Court found that: “Communication GA-0131/91, providing for suspension ordered by the respondent of the complainant’s inclusion in the pension and compensation system of Decree-Law 20530 and payment of his pension, is not applicable to the complainant, and his rights are hereby restored to 1 their status prior to this breach of the constitution ...”. 10. The petitioner contends that, despite the favorable decision obtained through the amparo action, on February 17, 1993, the company issued a new Board of Directors Decision No. 023/93, suspending Decisions Nos. 155 and 029/90 issued by the Board of Directors of the company in 1990, and consequently also suspending payment of the retirement pensions of the former employees, including himself. 11. In these circumstances, the petitioner brought another amparo action, that was declared without merit by the lower and appeal courts, in judgments issued on February 23 and July 14, 1995, respectively. In both judgments, the second amparo action was considered to be unnecessary, because the decision adopted in the first amparo action had the authority of res judicata and should impede any attempt to suspend the application of Decree Law 20530. The Supreme Court of Justice upheld these judgments on August 26, 1997. 12. The petitioner alleges that subsequently, on December 10, 1999, the Constitutional Court revoked the decision issued by the Supreme Court of Justice in the second amparo action, declaring it without merit. On that occasion, the Constitutional Court determined that the company’s Board of Directors Decision No. 023/93 was not applicable to the petitioner, and ordered the respondent company to continue the renewable retirement pension payments that Mr. Muelle had been receiving. 13. According to information presented by the parties, on April 7, 1997, the Fifth Civil Court of Lima issued a decision ordering execution of the Supreme Court’s final judgment of 1993, in the following terms: “THIS SERVES AS FINAL NOTICE TO THE RESPONDENT, the special mining company Tintaya Corporation (today, BHP Tintaya S.A.), to comply without restrictions, and within three days, with the order handed down by the Supreme Court on February 2, 1993, failing which certified copies 2 will be issued for preparation of the corresponding criminal complaint...”. 14. From documents provided by the petitioner, it appears that in 1994, the respondent company lodged a complaint in administrative court to declare the inclusion of Mr. Muelle Flores in the pension system of Decree-Law 20530 unlawful. However, the Constitutional and Corporate Law Division of the Supreme Court of Justice, in its decision handed down on October 29, 1997, declared said complaint without merit, thereby confirming the fact that petitioner belonged to the aforesaid pension system. 1 Communication of the petitioner received on November 12, 1998, annexes, Decision of the Supreme Court of Justice of February 2, 1993, Case file No. 1783-92 2 Communication of the petitioner received on June 14, 2004, annexes, Decision of the Fifth Civil Court of Lima of April 7, 1997, Case file No. 58-96 2