3 12. Another issue of interest that came up in this case has to do with the provisions on liability (in several spheres, as already noted, even if frequently of a criminal nature) in cases of deficient or misguided care. The subject of malpractice –again, one connected to ethical and technical issues – is one that arises often and intensely. Addressing this issue calls for legal provisions covering both prevention and verification and claims potentially leading to the application of punishment. Creating such body of provisions is also a specific duty of the State, rooted in the respect and guarantee obligation laid down by international human rights treaties, which the State must observe. 13. Different arguments have been raised in this regard. These include a proposal to establish crime definitions providing for punishable malpractice: crime descriptions featuring their own elements based on the protected legal interests, the perpetrator (the health service provider), the victim (the service patient), and the relationship between both (health care), in addition to further specifications of an instrumental or circumstantial nature. 14. The judgment rendered in the instant case establishes – and does so rightly, in my view – that it is not inevitably necessary to create a specific crime of malpractice, which, as a general rule, would be a crime of negligence. The general rules (notwithstanding the inclusion of qualifying rules: aggravated or mitigated crimes) on homicide or injury – maybe even other outcomes of punishable actions – might prove to be enough, on condition that they suffice to timely, sufficiently and proportionately deal with every unlawful conduct that might take place, exclusive of contexts of full impunity or inadmissible benevolence, which amounts to impunity in the end. 15. This situation, which allows the State to opt between different law-making alternatives, is different from a case in which there is an international instrument that is binding on the State and contains a description of the crime, such description being the result of extended analysis into which the concerns and decisions of the international community combine. Such is the case, as stated by the Court on various occasions – including in the judgment to which this Opinion relates –, with genocide, torture and forced disappearance, among others. In such cases, the State’s law-making decision is conditioned by a pre-existing normative decision in which the State also participated by ratifying or acceding to the relevant international treaty containing the elements that the domestic crime definition “must” feature. 16. It is true that the State is allowed to reconstruct the crime description provided in the international instrument by restating a given element or including others; however, it is also true that such reconstruction should not entail a reduction of the criminal consequences attributed to the facts, which are binding on the national law-makers, even though the latter may extend the criminal protection afforded to the relevant legal interest. That would create a disruption between the State’s duty to comply with the international mandate of criminal protection for that given interest or right, and the decision of the domestic criminal law-maker who has established the crime definition. Such disruption might entail incompatibility and, as the case may be, give rise to international responsibility. E) Expert bodies 17. In the instant case, the Court has taken into consideration the arguments raised by the parties in connection with the participation of a professional body (the Honor Tribunal) that was asked to issue an opinion on certain aspects of the medical treatment administered to the patient. This draws attention towards the