adequate defense and respect for due process. The petitioner indicates that this procedure was applied to another group of judges in the same circumstances, in accordance with Article 49 of the Constitution of the Republic. 21. The petitioner argues that by removing Judge Chocrón Chocrón from her post, the State violated the right to the guarantee of permanence in public service established in Article 23(c) of the American Convention. The petitioner submits that the right of the alleged victim to have access to public service on conditions of equality was violated, because of the absence of stability and conditions of equality in the public service. She suggests that since she was appointed as a temporary judge until a competitive examination could be convened, the alleged victim had a reasonable expectation that she would be confirmed as a career judge through a public competitive examination, as established by law. 22. Insofar as the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies and other admissibility requirements are concerned, the petitioner argues that domestic remedies were exhausted by the decision of the judicial organ (Supreme Court of Justice) dated October 19, 2004, of which notification was given on November 15, 2004. The petition was lodged on May 15, 2005, namely, within the six-month period. B. Position of the State 23. The State submits that the process for removal of the alleged victim was conducted in accordance with the law and that therefore the petition should be declared inadmissible. 24. The State indicates that the Judicial Committee of the Supreme Court of Justice is the organ that has the power to make temporary appointments, eminently discretionary in nature, in order to ensure continuity in the administration of justice, in the absence of the regular holder of the office, and of alternate judges appointed by the competitive examination. The State submits that Mrs. Chocrón Chocrón was serving as such a temporary judge at the time of her dismissal. 25. The State maintains that although Mrs. Chocrón Chocrón joined the judiciary when she was appointed as a temporary judge, she did not do so by the only constitutional channel provided for persons to embark on a judicial career, which is through a public examination. Therefore, at the time of her dismissal, the judge did not have the benefits conferred upon career judges, including first and foremost, stability in the public service. As a result, the State concludes that it is evident that the organ with the power to appoint judicial officials regulated by the judicial career may consequently proceed freely to rescind such an appointment if they should deem that advisable. In such cases, the decision on removal is not considered a disciplinary act but rather an act based on reasons of expediency which may not be challenged and are not subject to review. In this context, the State argues that the petitioner’s allegation to the effect that only the Operations and Reorganization Committee of the Judicial system could decide to revoke the post of temporary judge of the alleged victim does not apply, because the act was not a disciplinary one. IV. ANALYSIS OF COMPETENCE AND ADMISSIBILITY A. The Commission’s jurisdiction ratione materiae, ratione personae, ratione temporis and ratione loci 26. The petitioner is authorized by Article 44 of the Convention to lodge petitions with the IACHR. Since the petition indicates that the alleged victim is Mercedes Chocrón Chocrón, the Commission has jurisdiction ratione personae to examine the petition. As for the State, it ratified the American Convention on August 9, 1977. 27. The Commission has jurisdiction ratione loci to consider the petition, because it alleges violations of the rights protected under the American Convention which took place within the territory of a State party to that instrument. Moreover, the IACHR has jurisdictionratione temporis because the obligation to respect and guarantee the rights protected in the American 4