5 13. On March 27, 2009 the President informed the parties of her decision to admit the brief of the representative since, based on the jurisprudence of the Tribunal,8 a one-day delay in the forwarding of the brief was not considered an excessive term that would justify its rejection. 14. On March 23, 2009 the representatives presented their observations to the evidence that accompanied the State’s briefs of final arguments. Along with this brief the representatives forwarded a Ruling of March 18, 2009 issued by the Supreme Court of Justice (hereinafter “the TSJ”) “because it was part of the context of the violations of the present case.” 15. On May 11, 2009 the Presented asked the parties to, based on that stated in Article 45(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, forward evidence that would allow it to verify if, after the year 2004, initial formation programs and knowledge exams for the acceptance into the criminal jurisdiction have been carried out pursuant with Articles 14 through 37 of the “Regulations on the Evaluation and Competitive Tender for the Acceptance and Promotion to a Judicial Career.” 16. The parties issued their opinions regarding the requests made (supra para. 15) on May 20, 2009. The State forwarded documents supporting its position. Additionally, the State filed a brief on June 1, 2009, making observations on the information provided by the Commission. III PRELIMINARY OBJECTION (Lack of exhaustion of domestic remedies) 17. The State held that the alleged victim omitted filing the appeal for review before the Constitutional Chamber of the TSJ, and that said appeal “would have given her the possibility to annul the decision of the Political-Administrative Chamber” that did not order her reinstatement. According to the State, the Court should reconsider its jurisprudential criterion regarding the tacit waiver to the objection of lack of exhaustion of domestic remedies, since “[t]he principles of the Inter-American System, summarized in the Preamble of the American Convention, cannot be waived expressly or tacitly by the States” and, given that “[w]ithout the full and complete validity of Article 46 of the Convention, the coadjuvant or complementary nature of the Inter-American protection system […] results absolutely unprotected and diminished.” The State added that “the requirement of exhaustion of the domestic remedies constitutes an objective condition of admissibility that can be argued and revised, even ex officio, during any stage or instance of the international proceeding.” Finally, it stated that the tacit waiver “contradicts the positions adopted by [the] Inter-American Court regarding its power to correct the procedural errors of the parties.” 18. The Commission reiterated what it had stated in its admissibility report with regard to the fact that “the Venezuelan state participated in the processing of the case before [it] without filing at any time the objection of lack of exhaustion of domestic remedies.” It added that “[t]he mention of the need that the victim file an 8 Cf. Case of the “White Van” (Paniagua Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Preliminary Objections. Judgment of January 25, 1996. Series C No. 23, paras. 37 and 39; Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of July 1, 2006. Series C No. 148, para. 117, and Case of Kimel v. Argentina. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of May 2, 2008, Series C No. 177, para. 12.