42 to the Convention declared in the previous chapters, as well as in light of the criteria set in the Court’s jurisprudence with regard to the nature and scope of the obligation to repair, 174 the Court will proceed to analyze the claims presented by the Commission and the representatives, as well as the State’s position, with the objective of ordering the measures tending to repair the damages. 1. Injured party 157. The Court considers Mrs. Reverón Trujillo as the “injured party” in her condition of victim of the violations declared in her detriment, reason for which she shall be the beneficiary of the reparation measures set, in its case, by the Tribunal for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. 158. Regarding the victim’s brothers and sisters, Julián José Reverón Trujillo, José Rubén Reverón Trujillo, María Isabel Reverón Trujillo, and Maria Eugenia Reverón Trujillo, as well as with regard to her mother, María del Rosario Trujillo de Reverón, the Court observes that the Commission did not declare them as victims of any violation whatsoever in its Report on Merits and that in the application it identified Mrs. Reverón Trujillo as the only beneficiary of the reparations (supra para. 2). Therefore, the Tribunal, pursuant with its jurisprudence,175 will not consider the next of kin of the victim as an injured party. 2. Reinstatement of the victim to her position and payment of the salaries not perceived 159. The Commission requested that the State be ordered to “reinstate” the victim “to the position of Fourteenth First Instance Criminal Judge in Trial Duties of the Criminal Circuit of the Metropolitan Area of Caracas, or, in its defect, to a position with an equal hierarchy within the Judicial Power.” Likewise, it requested “the State be ordered to pay Mrs. Reverón Trujillo the salaries and economic benefits not perceived from her dismissal up until her effective reinstatement.” 160. The representatives indicated that “the comprehensive reparation for the arbitrary dismissal shall be the reinstatement to the same position or another of similar characteristics,” as well as the “order that [the victim] not be removed in a discretional manner without the due process.” Likewise, they requested the State be ordered “to estimate and effectively pay all the back pay and other work benefits not perceived, taking into consideration all the increases, bonuses, and other benefits perceived by First Instance Criminal judges, from the moment in which she was arbitrarily dismissed (February 6, 2002) and up to her effective reinstatement, including both delayed-payment interests as well as the monetary correction (indexation).” 161. The State argued that “the reinstatement of the citizen […] Reverón Trujillo to the position occupied by her in the Judicial Power in the present case, given her condition of provisional judge and her entrance to the justice system without the corresponding public competitive tender was not admissible.” For the State “a 174 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, supra note 156, paras. 25 through 27; Case of Perozo et al. v. Venezuela, supra note 9, para. 406, and Case of Kawas Fernández v. Honduras, supra note 15, para. 157. 175 Cf. Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, supra note 8, para. 98; Case of Bayarri v. Argentina, supra note 10, para. 126, and Case of Tiu Tojín v. Guatemala. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 26, 2008. Series C No. 190, para. 58.