" also society as a whole, because, by knowing the truth about such crimes, it can prevent them in the future" (para. 259). The right to know the truth is connected with the unavoidable duty of the State to effect an earnest and effective investigation of the events resulting in human rights violations and to identify, prosecute and punish those responsible, as the Court points out in the instant Judgment on the Case of Blanco Romero et al; it is only thus ─the Court adds─ that it can be guaranteed that chronic recurrence of such violations and rendering "the victims and their next of kin completely defenseless" will be avoided (para. 93). 5. The Court warns, right afterwards, that according its jurisprudence constante "no domestic law, statute or rule ─including amnesty laws and statutes of limitations─ may prevent a State from complying with the order of the Court to investigate and punish those responsible for human rights violations. Specifically, amnesty provisions, statutes of limitations and rules excluding liability purporting to prevent investigation and punishment of those responsible for serious violations of human rights ─such as those in the instant case, forced disappearances─ are inadmissible, for such violations infringe upon inderogable rights recognized under International Human Rights Law. (para. 97). 6. I understand such provisions to be inadmissible because they infringe all the rights forming the body of Human Rights International Law, ─indivisible as they all are─ both inderogable and derogable. This becomes particularly relevant in the struggle against impunity. In my experience for more that a decade serving on this Court, I have verified that the States Parties to the American Convention, and that are subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, find it less difficult to comply with pecuniary reparations than to comply with the duty to investigate as a form of non pecuniary reparation (giving satisfaction to the victims, to their next of kin, and to the social environment concerned). 7. Indeed, the provisions in Article 63(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights1 effectively provide the Inter-American Court with quite an amount of leeway regarding reparations. In my opinion, as pointed out in the Separate Opinions referred to above, in the cases of Myrna Mack Chang (2003) and of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre (2004) and as reasserted herein, some reparations with dissuasive or exemplary purposes (related to aggravated liability) may contribute both to the struggle against impunity and to guarantee non-recurrence of the harmful events. 8. The entire chapter on reparations for human rights violations requires a greater development in concept and in case law, starting with the acknowledgment of the close relation between the right to reparations and the right to justice. Such development is particularly necessary in the event of serious and systematic violations of human rights 1 Article 63(1) of the American Convention provides that: “─If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party.”