25 and as a general protection of human rights, through the specific protection of certain rights of given individuals. This prevalence of public or social interest over specific or institutional interest is well known in certain situations of national trials, where it also sustains the unofficial expediting of the proceeding and the autonomous investigation into the truth. 6. Of course, issuing an acquiescence or a confession entails withdrawal of the preliminary objections filed, as has in fact been done, inasmuch as they are a prerequisite for a subsequent jurisdictional act of the Court, one that could not take place –or whose issuance would be, at the least, very debatable- if the State that confesses or acquiesces argues, at the same time, that the court must not hear the matter raised in the application, due to inadmissibility or lack of competence. Acquiescence is an invitation to hear and decide on the merits. 7. In several more or less recent cases –and of course in the one I am now discussing- the State has made an “institutional acknowledgment” that puts into effect the possibility of immediately deciding on all or some disputed issues. Of course, this acknowledgment is a right of the respondent State, but at the same time it usually reflects implicit fulfillment of an obligation undertaken in light of the American Convention, inasmuch as the States that are parties to it have taken on the duty to respect the rights set forth in said instrument and to adopt such measures as may be necessary for this to be so. It is an expression of the pacta sunt servanda principle that corrects the offense committed in violation of that principle. Thus, compliance with the obligation derives from an act of the State (the acknowledgment) and provides an advancement for another act by the Court (the judgment). 8. It is necessary to express, as our court has done in certain cases, including this one, our appreciation of this conduct by the State, which has substantive and procedural implications, making it possible to solve the conflict with a contribution by the parties and not only through a ruling of the court, in accordance with the general motivation and nature of solutions that pertain to agreements among the parties. Their will, insofar as it contributes to the ultimate goal sought by whoever acquiesces or confesses, also contributes to the act of justice that is realized in the final ruling by the court. 9. In its April 29, 2004 ruling, the Court expressed that “the acknowledgment of international responsibility made by the State constitutes a positive contribution to the development of this process and to the effectiveness of the principles behind the American Convention on Human Rights” (para. 50). In this case, as in the Case of Molina Theissen v. Guatemala (which I mention here because the respective ruling was issued during the same session of the Court as the ruling in the instant case), the State added to its acquiescence regarding the facts and claims an unprecedented “request for forgiveness” addressed to the victims, the survivors and the next of kin, one that must be duly noted. This is, I believe, the first time that a State makes such a public statement during a trial before the Inter-American Court. 10. The expression “acknowledgment of international responsibility” includes several elements: it announces admission of a responsibility derived from an international commitment and it adds a qualification –“institutional”- that is not explicitly set forth in the provisions of the Inter-American adjudicatory system. Therefore, the Court must specify the meaning of this expression with respect to the